Arbitration under the MPMAA 1983 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Part II

In the previous post, we had provided a descriptive comment of the decision of the Supreme Court in MP Rural Road Development Authority v. LG Chaudhary Engineers where the two judges constituting the Bench did not agree with each other on whether disputes pertaining to cancellation of the Works Contract were to be referred to the arbitral tribunal constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyasthan Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (1983 Law). In this post, critique the decision:

The Disagreement between Ganguly, J and GyanSudha Mishra, J:

It appears that the Question that was referred to by the Two judge Bench is not whether the 1996 Act impliedly overrules the 1983 Law or whether the latter is repugnant to the former. As pointed out in the previous post, GyanSudha Mishra, J agreed with Ganguly, J. on the discussion that the 1983 Law was a special enactment and that it was neither repealed nor was repugnant to the 1996 Act. The issue in which both the judges differed is rather a simple one- whether the claims pertaining to wrongful termination of the Works Contract in the case were to be brought before the Tribunal under the 1983 Law or not. Gyan Sudha Mishra, J.(JGSM) did not think so because, according to her, when the Works Contract was terminated, it ceased to exist and since the definition of Works Contract in the 1983 Law does not cover aspects pertaining to termination, issues connected to wrongful termination were to be referred to arbitration under the 1996 Act and not under the 1983 Law. Ganguly, J. (JAKG) did not afford such a restricted construction to the 1983 Law. He stated (at para 9):

“From a perusal of Section 7, it is clear that the nature of the dispute between the parties in the instant case is covered by the definition under Section 2(d) [sic 2(1)(d)] read with Section 2(1) [sic 2(1)(i)]. As such under Section 7 such a dispute has to be statutorily referred to Tribunal set up under the [1983 Law].”

Therefore, the question referred to the larger bench was whether a dispute pertaining to cancellation of works contract can be brought before the Tribunal under 1983 Law or not.

It appears that there is a lot of (needless?) uncertainty in the law pertaining to the reference of disputes under Works Contracts (as defined in and as applicable per the 1983 Law) to arbitration under the 1996 Act. The next post on this issue will deal with those uncertainties. This post will deal with the specific question as to whether the dispute involved in the case could be referred to the tribunal under the 1983 Law.

Whether a dispute pertaining to cancellation of works contract can be brought before the Tribunal under 1983 Law or not:

Section 2(1)(i) defines "works-contract" to mean a written agreement for the execution of any work relating to works of the State Government or State Government PSU (“MP PSU”) and includes an agreement for the supply of goods or material and all other matters relating to the execution of any of the said works. It provides:

"(i) "works-contract" means an agreement in writing for the execution of any work relating to construction, repair or maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir, tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory, work-shop, powerhouse, transformers or such other works of the State Government or Public Undertaking as the State Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf at any of its stages, entered into by the State Government or by an official of the State Government or Public Undertaking or its official for and on behalf of such Public Undertaking and includes an agreement for the supply of goods or material and all other matters relating to the execution of any of the said works."

The purpose of the above definition is to define what kind of contracts would come within the purview of "works contracts". A contract for supply of goods simpliciter is not a Works Contract. Similarly, an agreement pertaining to legal consultancy entered into with the MP Government or an MP PSU is not a works contract. That being so, JGSM’s complaint that the definition of “works contract” does not encompass a dispute pertaining to termination is not convincing because the purpose of the definition is to delineate the kinds of contracts to which the 1983 Law would be applicable. JGKM argues (at para 5):

“However, the question whether the ‘works contract’ has been legally repudiated and rightly cancelled or not is the question or dispute pertaining to termination of works contract has not been incorporated even remotely within the definition of ‘works contract’.”

Why should it? Such a definition is not supposed to contain references to cancellation, repudiation or termination of the works contract. JGKM’s argument would have been correct if there was exclusion, implied or express, of disputes pertaining to termination, repudiation or cancellation in the definition of “Dispute”. There is no express exclusion of termination in the definition of “dispute” under Section 2(1)(d), which provides:

“(d) "dispute" means claim of ascertained money valued at Rupees 50,000 or more relating to any difference arising out of the execution or non-execution of a works contract or part thereof;”

The above definition provides for two aspects:

• The claims to come within the purview of “dispute” should be Rs. 50,000 or above.
• The claims must arise out of the execution or non-execution of a works contract or part thereof. 

There is nothing which impliedly suggests that disputes pertaining to cancellation of works contract should be out of the purview of the 1983 Law. In fact, there are indications in the Law that questions pertaining to termination would come within the meaning of “Dispute”:

• The Long Title of the Act read with Section 2(d) conveys the intent of the legislature that disputes pertaining to Works Contract should be brought before the Tribunal.
• There appears no reason for the 1983 Law to exclude only questions pertaining to cancellation from the purview of the tribunal.

JGSM provides a different reasoning for her decision. According to the Judge, the 1983 Law comes into operation only if there exists a Works Contract;the 1983 Law is not applicable if there is no Works Contract in existence on account of termination. This reasoning is faulty. Section 7B(2-A) of the 1983 Law provides:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless it is made within three years from the date on which the works contract is terminated, foreclosed, abandoned or comes to an end in any other manner or when a dispute arises during the pendency of the works contract:

Provided that if a reference petition is filed by the State Government, such period shall be thirty years.”

The above provision states that the Tribunal under the 1983 Law shall admit petition for reference of disputes only if such petition is made within three years from the date of termination, foreclosure or abandonment or other means in which the contract comes to an end. This is in complete contradiction to the stance of JGSM that if the Works Contract “itself has been terminated, cancelled or repudiated as it has happened in the instant case, then the nature of dispute does not fall within the definition of ‘works contract’…”  Section 7B(2A) impliedly empowers the Claimant to make a reference to the Tribunal even after termination, foreclosure or abandonment of the Works Contract but within three years from the termination of the contract.

JGSM tries to raise an artificial wall separating claims that in relation to a terminated contract and those claims which arise from a contract which is not terminated. Such a separation is unwarranted, at least for the reasons disclosed by the judge.

More in another post.

Implied Repeal of the MPMAA 1983 by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Part I

This series of posts looks that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in MP Rural Road Development Authority v. LG Chaudhary Engineers, where the two judges constituting the Bench differed on whether the disputes pertaining to the contracts in the case were capable of being referred to arbitration under Madhya Pradesh Madhyasthan Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (1983 Law). The first part of this two part series briefly discusses the facts and the two judgements. In the second part of the series, we critique the two judgements.

Facts:

MP Rural Road Development Authority (MPRRDA) and LG Chaudhary Engineers (Contractor) entered into a “works contract” (Contract) for the construction and maintenance of a rural road. Clause 24.1 of the Contract provided:

“24.1 If any dispute or difference of any kind what-so-ever shall arise in connection with or arising out of this Contract or the execution of work of maintenance of the Works thereunder, whether before its commencement or during the progress of Works or after the termination, abandonment or breach of the Contract, it shall, in the first instance, be referred for settlement to competent authority, described along with their powers in the Contract Data, above the rank of the Engineer. The competent authority shall, within a period of forty five days after being requested in writing by the Contractor to do so, convey his decision to the Contractor. Such decision in respect of every matter so referred shall, subject to review as hereinafter provided, be final and binding upon the Contract. In case the Works is already in progress, the Contractor shall proceed with the execution of the Works, including maintenance thereof, pending receipt of the decision of the competent authority as aforesaid, with all due diligence.” (emphasis added)

On the ground that the Contractor committed several breaches, MPRRDA terminated the Contract and encashed the bank guarantee submitted by the Contractor.

The Contractor submitted a set of claims to MPRRDA and asked it to appoint the arbitrator. MPRRDA stated that the arbitration was to be under the MPRRDA. Consequently, the Contractor approached the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act or 1996 Act). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Va Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. MPSEB,MANU/SC/0569/2010, the High Court appointed allowed the application and appointed the arbitrator.

MPRRDA appealed to the Supreme Court.

Since the Two Judge Bench (consisting of AK Ganguly and Gyan Sudha Mishra, JJ.) differed on whether the claims in the case could be referred to arbitration under the 1983 Law, the Bench referred the matter to the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench to decide the question.

Decision of AK Ganguly, J: 

Ganguly, J’s decision that the disputes were to be decided by the arbitral tribunal constituted under the 1983 Law was based on the following reasons:

• The 1983 Law is a special law that is applicable for disputes in which the Madhya Pradesh Government or a Madhya Pradesh Public Sector Undertaking is a party. There are several special features of the arbitral tribunal constituted under the 1983 Law, such as the absence of arbitration agreement, special qualifications of the Judicial Members of the tribunal, specific definition of “dispute”, special terms of office, salaries and allowances of the members of the tribunal, power of the Chairman of the tribunal to constitute benches, inherent powers of the tribunal, the power of the High Court of revision, absence of choice of parties in appointing the arbitrators, non-applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1940, etc. Even the Supreme Court has held in State of MP v. Anshuman Shukla [(2008) 7 SCC 487] that the 1983 Law was a “special Act” and that the 1996 Act did not apply to an arbitration under the 1983 Law. The 1983 Law, being a special enactment, is saved by Section 2(4), which reads:

“(4) This Part except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as the provision of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder;” (A similar provision was contained in Section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1940)

• Va Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. MPSEB, MANU/SC/0569/2010, was probably decided without noticing Section 2(4) or the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of the Supreme Court in State of MP v. Anshuman Shukla [(2008) 7 SCC 487]. Therefore, Va Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. MPSEB, MANU/SC/0569/2010, was rendered per incurium.
• It was the contention of the Contractor that the 1983 Law was repealed by the 1996 Act. Such a contention is liable to be rejected as Section 85 of the 1996 Act (“Repeal and Saving”) did not expressly repeal the 1983 Law.
• It was further contended by the Contractor that the 1983 Law is repugnant to the 1996 Act. This contention is also liable to be rejected as Entry 13 of the Concurrent Listin Schedule VII of the Constitution (“Civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this constitution, limitation and arbitration;”). Both the 1983 Law and the 1940 Act operated in view of Section 46 of the 1940 Act. Further, the 1983 Law received Presidential assent on 17.10.1983 and was published in the MP Gazette Extraordinary on 12.10.1983, thereby satisfying the requirements of Section 254(2). Consequently, the 1983 Law prevailed in the State of MP.

Hence, the arbitration would lie under the 1983 Law and not the 1996 Act.

Decision of Gyan Sudha Mishra, J:

Gyan Sudha Mishra, J agreed with Ganguly, J. on the discussion that the 1983 Law was a special enactment and that it was neither repealed nor was repugnant to the 1996 Act but disagreed with the conclusion on a different reasoning. According to her:

“While concurring and endorsing the reasonings assigned in the judgement of learned Justice Ganguly, I propose to add and thus partly dissent on certain aspects involved in the instant appeal which would have a bearing on the relief granted to the respondent by the High Court...”

A summary of her reasoning and decision is as below:

• Section 7 of the 1983 Law provides for reference by either party of a works contract of a dispute to the tribunal irrespective of the existence or the non-existence of an arbitration agreement. “Works Contract” has a special meaning under the 1983 Law. Section 2(i) provides:

‘“works contract” means an agreement in writing for the execution of any work relating to construction, repair or maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir, tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory workshop, powerhouse, transformers or such other works of the State Government or Public Undertaking as the State Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf at any of its stages, entered into by the State Government or by an official of the State Government or Public Undertaking or its official for and on behalf of such Public Undertaking and includes an agreement for the supply of goods or material and all other matters relating to the execution of any of the said works.’

•  Since the definition of works contract only covers matters relating to execution of the works and “does not include the dispute pertaining to termination, cancellation or repudiation of works contract” and since “the question whether the ‘works contract’ has been legally repudiated and rightly cancelled or not is the question or dispute pertaining to termination of works contract has not been incorporated even remotely within the definition of ‘works contract’, such disputes would be referred to arbitration under the 1996 Act. This view is fortified by the ratio of the Supreme Court in Maharishi Dayanand University v. Anand Co-operative Society [(2007) 5 SCC 295] and also in view of the persuasive reasoning in Heyman v. Darwins 1942 (1) All ER 337. Where the works contract is terminated, it becomes non-existent and the matter is to be referred to an arbitrator under the 1996 Act.
• However, questions pertaining to the execution of works, including those pertaining to execution of works etc would come within the scope of the tribunal under the 1983 Law.
• Therefore, the appointment of arbitrator by the High Court in the Section 11 application is correct. 

In the next Part in this series, We will critically analyse the two judgements.

Access the Business Standard article on the case from here.

Investment Arbitration between White Industries Australia Limited and Government India under the India- Australia BIT

In a previous post in this blog we had covered an investment arbitration between White Industries Australia Limited and the Government of India under the India Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty. An informal request for info to my practising friends has revealed that the Investment Arbitration has reached its final stages and only the award is yet to be passed (Thanks to Deepak Raju of the Lex Arbitri Blog). The purpose of this post is to give certain background facts in relation to the reason for White Industries to invoke arbitration. 

Coal India Limited (CIL) and White Industries Australia Limited (WIAL) signed an agreement in September 1989 for the turnkey development of the Open-cast Coal Mine at Piparwar. An Open-cast mine is an excavation made on the surface of the ground for extracting coal and is open and accessible from the ground surface during the life of the mine (source).  Article 3, Part II of the Agreement contained the arbitration clause, which read:

"3.1 The Parties mutually agree that in the event of a dispute of any nature whatsoever, related directly or indirectly to this Agreement, they shall use every means at their disposal to settle said dispute on an amicable basis.
3.2 Should the Parties fail to reach an agreement within thirty (30) days after the dispute arises or any such greater period as may be mutually agreed upon, the dispute may be submitted by either Party to Arbitration for final settlement under the rules of conciliation and arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. Paris. France, by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the Rules.
3.3 Said arbitration shall be held in and be conducted in the English language.
3.4 The Parties mutually agree that if the decision rendered as a result of the aforementioned conciliation or arbitration involves the payment of compensation, the amount of such compensation shall be expressed and payable in dollars.
3.5 Both Parties shalf make endeavours not to delay the arbitration proceedings. The decision of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on both parties.Enforcement thereof may be entered in any court having jurisdiction."

Article 4.1, Part III of the Agreement provided that the Agreement was to be governed by the "laws in force in India except that the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 shall not apply."

Disputes arose between CIL and WIAL  in relation to levy by CIL of penalty as contemplated under the Agreement.. The relevant clause provided that in case the proof of production of coal was more than the guaranteed production, WIAL would be entitled to bonus as per a pre-determined formula and if the proof of production of coal was lesser than the guaranteed production, WIAL shall be liable for the payment of penalty, again, as per a pre-determined formula.

Since the parties could not amicably settle the dispute, WIAL filed a Request for Arbitration with the Secretary General of the ICC's International Court of Arbitration (ICA) in July 1999. WIAL appointed Trevor Morling QC as its arbitrator. CIL nominated Justice BP Jeevan Reddy  as its arbitrator. The Chairman of the Tribunal- Max Abrahamson- was appointed by the ICA in November 1999. The seat of arbitration was Paris but the hearings were held for convenience in London. The award was passed in May 2002. The tribunal held that WIAL was entitled to a bonus of AU $ 2,281,600 and was also liable for a penalty of AU $ 969,060. The tribunal (with Justice BP Jeevan Reddy dissenting) found that in total (including the bank guarantee amount), WIAL was entitled to AU $ 4,085,180 and interest at 8% per annum. The details of the award are below:

Award Particulars	Amount
Net sum entitled	AU $ 4,085,180.00
Interest at 8% per annum	AU $ 326,814.40
Legal and other Costs	AU $ 500,000.00
Arbitrator and ICC fee (after set off)	US $ 84,000.00

A scanned copy of the award can be accessed from here (pardon the badly scanned award).

CIL filed an application under Section 34 r/w Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award (AP. No. 290/ 2002). WIAL filed an application in the said proceedings (GA 934/ 2003) for rejection of AP. No. 290/ 2002 on the basis of the following grounds:

• Parties had agreed that Arbitration Act, 1940 would not be applicable to the arbitration
• There was no provision in the 1996 Act for setting aside foreign awards.
• Part I of the Act containing Section 34 was applicable only in respect of domestic awards
• The Indian Arbitration law was not applicable and the French Arbitration Law was applicable

The above were countered by CIL on the ground that procedural law of the place of award applied only till the arbitration proceedings ended.

Relying upon certain observations made in Sumitomo Heavy Industries v. ONGC  Bhatia International and Nirma v. Lurgie Energie, the Calcutta High Court held that the application filed by CIL under Section 34 was maintainable. The judgement of the High Court in GA 934/ 2003 can be accessed from here (again, pardon the badly scanned judgement). An appeal before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by WIAL was rejected. Further appeal to the Supreme Court (CA 6284/ 2004) has not yet been decided. The said matter is being heard by the Supreme Court along with Bharat Aluminium v. Kaiser Aluminium, the case in which the Supreme Court has been asked to re-consider Bhatia International. The latest order in the matter can be accessed from here.

More on the investment arbitration in another post.

[The award and the judgement of the Calcutta High Court in GA 934/ 2003 were obtained through an application dated 06.10.2011 under the Right to Information Act, 2005 from Coal India Limited. Although this blawgger had asked for the judgement of the Division Bench in the application, Coal India Limited had given the judgement in GA 934/ 2003 by mistake. In any case, Coal India Limited was prompt in responding to the request for information. This blawgger's application was received only on 31.10.2011 by Coal India Limited. They sent a Reply dated 22.11.2011 asking this blawgger to pay some money for the photocopying. After receiving this blawgger's fee on 12.01.2012, Coal India sent a letter dated 17.01.2012 providing the documents. In all, Coal India took not more than 30 days to respond to the request. This blawgger profuesely thanks the CPIO, Coal India Limited for the prompt response.]

Indian Arbitration in Many Dimensions

The title to this post, followers of arbitration would recognise, is a "rip-off" from a very interesting piece on arbitration by Jan Paulsson titled "Arbitration in Three Dimensions". For quite some time, arbitration in India has perhaps been the most widely used alternative to litigation so much so that in many sectors litigation has become an alternative to arbitration. Although India is still a nascent jurisdiction as regards arbitration, the variety of situations in which it is employed is quite surprising. This post, however, is not aimed at pointing out those various situations. This post's aim is merely to note the recent developments on arbitration in India. One would, however, hardly disagree with this blawgger after perusing through the post that arbitration for whatever reason has become a very important mechanism to settle disputes arising out of various fields in or related to India.

Petroleum:

The Oil & Gas industry, as the petroleum industry is called, is one of the most dynamic and quarrelsome industries. India is no exception to this. Reliance has invoked arbitration under its Production Sharing Contract for the KG-DWN-98/1 Block in the Krishna Godavari basin against the Government of India. The arbitration is aimed at preempting the government from disallowing recovery of costs incurred in the development of the Block. News reports suggest that the amount in stake might be around USD 1.24 billion (roughly around 6585 crores). High stakes indeed! The links to several news items on this can be accessed from here.

Kishanganga Arbitration:
Followers of this blog are well aware of the developments taking place in the arbitration between Pakistan (Claimant) and India (Respondent) conducted under the aegis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for resolving disputes arising under the Indus Water Treaty. We, alongwith several Indian blawgs such as Lex Arbitri, have been closely following the arbitration (the posts in this blog on the Kishanganga arbitration can be accessed from the blog label "Arbitration: Indus Water Treaty Dispute"). Readers may be well aware that the Arbitral Tribunal in the case passed interim measures ordering India to not proceed with activities that it considered to be permanent. The interim order passed by the Tribunal can be accessed from this link (pdf). The interim order presents an interesting read.

Another India - Pakistan Arbitration?
While the Kishanganga arbitration is pending between both the countries, another issue between the two countries has cropped up- this one concerning granting of carbon credits to India in respect of the Nimoo Bazgo Power Project without getting Pakistan's consent on the transboundary environmental impact. Pakistan is alleging that India had obtained the carbon credits by using fake documents to show Pakistan's consent for the project. India applied for carbon credits in respect of the project in 2006 and obtained the same in 2008. According to news reports, a Former Indus Water Commissioner of Pakistan was incompetent and did not pursuing the matter when India had applied for the carbon credits. The Pakistan government had decided to arrest the said bureaucrat. Meanwhile the said bureaucrat is said to have fled to Canada. News reports on this issue can be accessed from here, here and here.

Reconsidering Bhatia International:
A Constitution Bench headed by CJI SH Kapadia is re-considering the questions visited by the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International. Indian Corporate Law Blog has got an excellent post on what happened in the first week of the hearing. It would seem that the significant point raised in favour of Bhatia International  is the absence of substantive review of arbitral awards in most jurisdictions. The court has to consider this point in the background of party autonomy, international trade and the fact that substantive review is near-absent in the supposedly "advanced" arbitral jurisdictions. Another important factor that is significant is that such substantive review is optional even under the existing scheme. Writings on this development can be found here, here and here.

Developments in the Indian Court of Arbitration for Sports:
The December decision of the General Body of the Indian Olympic Association (IOA) to dissolve the Ethics and the Indian Court of Arbitration for Sports (ICAS) become controversial when the Secretary General of the IOA expressed his displeasure on it. Consequently, the IOA decided to retain these two committees. Check out the news reports from here and here. In a previous post in this blog, we had reported that an Indian Court of Arbitration for Sports (ICAS) was formed. A news report suggests that the Indian Court of Arbitration for Sports (ICAS) will consist of three additional retired judges- Supreme court Judge (Retd) HS Bedi, High Court Judges (Retd) SK Agrawal and Manju Goel.

Jindal-Bolivia Arbitration:
Indian steel company Jindal Steel and Power limited had entered into a mining agreement with the Government of Bolovia. It appears that Jindal has invoked arbitration under the aegis of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC against Bolovia. A comprehensive post on the issue can be found in the International Law Curry blog. This post also discusses in brief investment arbitrations in which India/ Indian national is a party. Don't miss this brief but interesting post! The post refers to an investment dispute raised by an Indian national (lawyer) against the UK.

Arbitration in the Supreme Court of India: 2011

In this post, we list out the most noteworthy judgements of the Supreme Court of India on arbitration in 2011. We’ll list out each judgement and give links to descriptive comments/ critique on each of the cases.

1) State of Maharashtra v. Ark Builders  (28.02.2011)

Question: When does the limitation period prescribed in Section 34(3) start running?

Comments: Practical Academic (descriptive)

2) Booz Allen & Hamilton v SBI Home Finance (15.04.2011)

Question: Arbitrability of actions in rem.

Comments: Vinod Kothari (on how the judgement affects the asset recovery market- don’t miss this one- critique); MyLaw (descriptive & critique); Lex Arbitri (descriptive); Nishith Desai & Associates- Dispute Resolution Hotline (descriptive); Indian Corporate Law (descriptive); Practical Academic in Two Parts- Part I & Part II (descriptive);

3) Union of India v. Tantia Constructions (18.04.2011)

Issues: Exercise of powers under Article 226 in contractual matters despite arbitration agreement

Comments: Indian Corporate Law (descriptive); Money Control (descriptive); Lex Arbitri (descriptive); Nishith Desai Hotline (descriptive); Practical Academic (critique)

4) Videocon Industries v. Union of India (11.05.2011)

Issues: Exclusion of Part I & Transfer of Seat

Comments: Sumit Rai [(2011) 14 Int Arb L Rev      ] (descriptive & critique); Indian Corporate Law (descriptive); Lex Arbitri (descriptive & critique); Practice Source- Kluwer Law International (descriptive); Practical Academic (Part I, Part II & Part III) (descriptive & Critique)

5) State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (04.07.2011)

Issues: Whether it is necessary to raise counter-claims in proceedings under Section 11 to entitle the Respondent to raise them in the arbitraiton?

Comments: Indian Corporate Law (descriptive); MyLaw (descriptive); Nishith Desai Hotline (descriptive); Practical Academic (descriptive)

6) Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports (08.07.2011)

Issue: Maintenance of letters patent appeal in the absence of explicit right under the Act

Comments: Indian Corporate Law (descriptive)

7) SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. v.Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. (20.07.2011)

Issues: Validity of unstamped and Unregistered Deeds containing arbitration clauses

Comments: International Law Office (descriptive); The In-House Lawyer (descriptive) Nishith Desai Hotline (descriptive); Indian Corporate Law (descriptive); Practical Academic (critique)

8) Bharat Rasiklal Ashra v. Gautam Rasiklal Ashra (25.08.2011)

Issue: Allocation of the right to decide the question as to validity of an arbitration agreement alleged to have been vitiated by forgery or fabrication.  

Comments: Lex Arbitri (Critique); The Legal Blog (descriptive)

9) Yograj Infrastructure v Ssangyong Engineering (I) (01.09.2011) & Yograj Infrastructure v. Ssangyong (II) (15.12.2011)

Issue: Implied Exclusion of Part I of the Act           

Comments: Indian Corporate Law (descriptive & critique) Practical Academic (Part I, Part II); Practical Academic (descriptive) (on Yograj II)

10) Phulchand Exports Ltd. v. OOO Patriot (12.10.2011)

Issue: Whether enforcement of the foreign award would contravene public policy of India as per Section 48(2)(b) of the Act?

Comments: Lex Arbitri (critique) CIS Arbitration Forum (critique); Practical Academic (descriptive & critique)

11) PR Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. v. BHH Securities (P) Ltd. & Ors. (14.10.2011)

Issue: Consolidation of arbitration

Comments: Indian Corporate Law (critique); Lex Arbitri (descriptive); Practical Academic (descriptive)

In case we have missed out on any case, please let us know.