"I realise that some of my criticisms may be mistaken; but to refuse to criticize judgements for fear of being mistaken is to abandon criticism altogether... If any of my criticisms are found to be correct, the cause is served; and if any are found to be incorrect the very process of finding out my mistakes must lead to the discovery of the right reasons, or better reasons than I have been able to give, and the cause is served just as well."

-Mr. HM Seervai, Preface to the 1st ed., Constitutional Law of India.

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

Breaking (!) Ban on Penalty Clauses Survives! UK SC in Cavendish Square Holding v Talal El Makdessi

Regular readers of this Blog would be aware of the recent post on the UK Supreme Court's case of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (Earlier posts on case in this blog can be accessed from here and here.). The issues involved in this case are:
  1. Whether the rule against penalties applies to commercial contracts between sophisticated parties.
  2. If the rule does apply to such contracts, whether clauses 5.1 and 5.6 are within the scope of the rule.
  3. If the clauses are within the scope of the rule against penalties, whether the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that they were penal and therefore unenforceable.
In this case, it was contended  by one of the parties that the rule against penalties should go as a whole irrespective of whether the contract was a commercial contract. The UK SC would be authoritatively ruling on the rule against penalties which, rudimentarily put, restricts damages to the actual losses suffered and has been established for more than two centuries.

The Supreme Court has decided the case today (04.11.2015). Following is a summary of conclusions of the court on the rule against penalties (as taken from the UK SC Press Release):

1) The penalty rule is an “ancient, haphazardly constructed edifice which has not weathered well” but has stood the test of time. Similar rules exists in all all other developed systems of law.
2) Therefore, it should not therefore be abolished. At the same time, it should not also be extended unnecessarily.
3) Penalty clauses not merely apply to clauses relating to money penalties but also to obligations to transfer assets, or clauses where one party forfeits a deposit following its’ breach of contract.
4) The concepts of ‘deterrence’ and “genuine pre-estimate of loss” in determining whether a clause is a penalty or not are not relevant.
5) The true test, according to Lord Mance, is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.
6) The method of applying this test is as follows:
a) The first step is to consider whether any (and if so what) legitimate business interest is served and protected by the clause, and if so,
b) whether the provision made for that interest is extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable.
7) The test to determine penalty clauses, according to Lord Hodge, is whether the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of a breach of contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to the innocent party’s interest in the performance of the contract. A clause, according to Lord Hodge, fixing a level of damages payable on breach will be a penalty if there is an extravagant disproportion between the stipulated sum and the highest level of damages that could possibly arise from the breach.

The judgement can be accessed from here. The Press Summary of the UK Supreme Court can be accessed from here. More on this judgement and the Bunge SA judgement in the next few posts in this blog.

No comments: