- such rate is to be based on “robust underlying market”;
- while determining such alternative reference rate, courts should “have regard to the liquidity of that underlying market over time, market functioning issues, usefulness to all market participants and the ability to produce and maintain the alternative rates…”
- Such rate should “be able to test the rate by reference to historical data…”;
- It should “consider resilience to changing market conditions, structures and regulations; placing weight on the diversity of market participants, the stability of their participation and their credit quality over time; how changes in participation could affect the benchmark; the transparency of the benchmark and the need for an ongoing ability to assess the rate’s quality…”According to the court, such a rate was the “CME Term SOFR and adding the ISDA Spread Adjustment”.
-Mr. HM Seervai, Preface to the 1st ed., Constitutional Law of India.
Tuesday, November 19, 2024
LIBOR Cessation, Implied Terms & Alternative Reference Rate: English High Courts Decides
Saturday, November 9, 2024
In House Counsels as Judicial Members in Tribunals such as NCLT and NCLAT
Please refer to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in SBI v. The Consortium of Mr. Murari Lal, 2024 INSC 852, where it has been held:
Wednesday, October 9, 2024
Govt. Tries to find a Way Around the Atomic Energy Act
Tuesday, September 24, 2024
Supreme Court Dismisses Challenge to Atomic Energy Act
The Supreme Court of India has dealt with an important matter of contemporary relevance: atomic energy in India. This post addresses the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sandeep TS v. Union of India, Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).564/2024: Order dt. 17.09.2024: SCI.
A writ petition was filed early this year by one Mr. Sandeep TS, a physicist and an Indian citizen residing in the USA. The writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India raising a grievance against the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (“Atomic Energy Act”) as it allegedly restricted, unduly, the involvement of private parties in licensing for nuclear energy.
The matter came up before a three judge Bench consisting of
the Hon’ble Mr. Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.B.
Pardiwala, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra. The three judge Bench referred
to the Long Title of the Atomic Energy Act and Section 14 thereof.
The Long Title to the Atomic Energy Act reads: “An Act to
provide for the development, control and use of atomic energy for the welfare
of the people of India and for other peaceful purposes and for matters
connected therewith.”
Section 2(1)(g) defines the term “prescribed substance” as
“any substance including any mineral which the Central Government may, by
notification, prescribe, being a substance which in its opinion is or may be
used for the production or use of atomic energy or research into matters
connected therewith and includes uranium, plutonium, thorium, beryllium,
deuterium or any of their respective derivatives or compounds or any other
materials containing any of the aforesaid substances;”
Section 14 of the said Act provided for the following:
- Central Government may make rules relating to control over production and use of atomic energy.
- Central Government may prohibit except under a licence activities prescribed in Section 14(1), including the acquisition, production, possession, use, disposal, export or import of a prescribed substance, etc.
- A licence for the acquisition, production, possession, use, disposal, export or import of any plant designed or adopted or manufactured for the production, development and use of atomic energy or for research into matters connected therewith can only be given to a Department of the Central Government or any authority or an institution or a corporation established by the Central Government, or a Government company.
- A licence granted to a Government company under Section 14(1) would stand cancelled when such company ceases to be a Government company.
- The extent of rule making power of the Central Government under this provision.
So, when the petitioner challenged the Atomic Energy Act as
unduly restrictive, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge on the following
grounds:
- The Parliament has introduced the Atomic Energy Act for a calibrated exploitation of atomic energy and subjected it to strict safeguards considering the adverse effects of misuse or accident.
- Hence, this Act cannot be considered as arbitrary or as interfering with the Petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Accordingly, the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Followers of this blog may recollect a post titled "Small Modular Nuclear reactors in India: Liberalisation of Regime & Way Forward last year where we highlighted the same issue. The Supreme Court in this case rightly dismissed the petition since this is a matter for the Legislature to take a call.
Tuesday, September 17, 2024
Section 29A Arbitration Act & Time Limit for Filing Application
Section 29A(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Arbitration Act") in its relevant portion states:
"(1)The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23..."
If the award is not made within this period or an extension period (of up to six months) agreed between the parties, the mandate of the arbitrator "shall terminate". The exception to this termination is where prior to or after expiry of that period, the Court extends such period. This extension is to be granted by the court on an application made by a party and for sufficient cause. Once the application for extension is filed, the mandate of the arbitrator is to continue till disposal of the application.
In Rohan Builders v Berger Paints, 2024 INSC 686 (Rohan Builders), the question decided the important question of whether an application for extension of time u/s 29A could be filed after the expiry of the period specified in S. 29A(1) (i.e., 12 months from completion of pleadings).
The court had to construe Section 29A(4), which, in its relevant part provides:
"(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period..."
Taking note of this provision, the court held that it could be deduced from this "unambiguous language" that the Court could extend the time "where an application is filed after the expiry of the period". (Para 7). Note this the provision quoted does not explicitly talk about the application being filed after the expiry- it only deals with the power of the court to extend the period after its expiry.
The court also noted that if either party took no action, "the arbitration proceedings are terminated". (Para 10). However, this does not mean that if no application is filed within 12 months or the extended six months period (u/s 29A(3)), the mandate of the arbitrator would terminate or that the arbitrator would become de jure incapable of performing her function. Construing the effect of "terminate" in 29A(4), the Supreme Court held:
"The word “terminate” in the contextual form does not reflect termination as if the proceedings have come to a legal and final end, and cannot continue even on filing of an application for extension of time." (Para 12).
Hence, the termination contemplated in S. 29A(4) is not an "absolute" termination (Para 12). The court reasoned that if a rigid construction of the provision was made, that would amount to legislating a limitation period judicially, which was not "conspicuously" stated by the provision. (Para 13). The court also noted that "the expression and intent of the provision are to the contrary." (Para 13).
The court also gave an ex post facto justification for its construction: if a rigid construction was given to the provision, it would mean more frequent applications and interventions by courts, and worse, re-commencing the arbitration once again, which would only impede arbitration (para 14).
The court stated that this construction would not encourage rogue litigants who would be bent on making the time limit for award inconsequential since the court could, on sufficient cause alone, extend the time limit, and can also impose time limits. The SC was also conscious that in the process of application u/s 29A, the court could substitute the arbitrators, thereby eliminating the need for going through another round of appointment process or S. 11 proceedings.
Interestingly, the court also made it clear that the arbitral tribunal could not pass the award till an application u/s 29A(5) is filed before the court. Even if the award is passed, the court could invoke its powers u/s 29A. The court held:
"Therefore, the arbitral tribunal may not pronounce the award till an application under Section 29A(5)of the A & C Act is sub-judice before the court. In a given case, where an award is pronounced during the pendency of an application for extension of period of the arbitral tribunal, the court must still decide the application under sub-section (5), and may even, where an award has been pronounced, invoke, when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the A & C Act." (Para 17)
In conclusion, the court answered the question before it in the following manner:
"... an application for extension of the time period for passing an arbitral award under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period, as the case may be. The court while adjudicating such extension applications will be guided by the principle of sufficient cause and our observations in paragraph 15 of the judgment." (Para 19).
Saturday, July 27, 2024
Nine Judge Bench of SCI in Mineral Area Development Authority v SAIL, 2024 INSC 554: Summary
One of the most important matters in the recent times has been decided by a nine-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, 2024 INSC 554. It deals with the important issue of the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States as regards taxation of mineral rights. It also decided on the nature of royalty insofar as it is applicable to minerals.
The issue of royalty came into play in the
context of its classification. It royalty is classified as a tax, prior
decisions have held that State legislatures lacked competence to levy taxes on
mineral rights as they were dealt with under Entry 54, List I, VII Schedule, where
Union had the exclusive competence. Some decisions held that royalty was not
tax and therefore the State legislatures were competent to make laws further to
Entry 49, List II, VII Schedule, where States had the exclusive competence. This
conflict is the subject of decision of the nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court.
Initially, about 11 questions were recorded by
a three judge Bench as having to be determined. During the hearing before the nine judge Bench, there was
consensus between the counsels for the Petitioners and the Respondents as to
the questions that were to be determined by the nine judge-Bench. Union of
India filed an affidavit stating that Entry 53, List I, Schedule VII which
related to mineral oils/ petroleum/ oil fields, was not covered in the issues
before the court. So, the Supreme Court did not discuss these aspects in the
decision. The questions to be determined reduced from 11 to merely five. Of the
nine judges, Justice Ms. Nagaratna dissented. The majority view was penned by Chief
Justice Mr. Chandrachud.
The court’s ultimate determination vis-Ã -vis these
questions as contained in Para 342 of the Majority judgment is provided below:
Question a. What is the
true nature of royalty determined under Section 9 read with Section 15(1) of
the MMDR Act? Whether royalty is in the nature of tax;
Finding:
“a. Royalty is not a tax. Royalty
is a contractual consideration paid by the mining lessee to the lessor for
enjoyment of mineral rights. The liability to pay royalty arises out of the
contractual conditions of the mining lease. The payments made to the Government
cannot be deemed to be a tax merely because the statute provides for their
recovery as arrears;”
b. What is the scope of Entry
50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule? What is the ambit of the limitations
imposable by Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 54 of
List I? Does Section 9, or any other provision of the MMDR Act, contain any
limitation with respect to the field in Entry 50 of List II?
c. Whether the expression
“subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral
development” in Entry 50 of List II pro tanto subjects the entry to Entry 54 of
List I, which is a non-taxing general entry? Consequently, is there any departure from the
general scheme of distribution of legislative powers as enunciated in M P V
Sundararamier (supra)?
Determination: “b. Entry 50 of
List II does not constitute an exception to the position of law laid down in M
P V Sundararamier (supra). The legislative power to tax mineral rights vests
with the State legislatures. Parliament does not have legislative competence to
tax mineral rights under Entry 54 of List I, it being a general entry. Since
the power to tax mineral rights is enumerated in Entry 50 of List II, Parliament
cannot use its residuary powers with respect to that subject-matter;”
c. Entry 50 of List II envisages
that Parliament can impose “any limitations” on the legislative field created
by that entry under a law relating to mineral development. The MMDR Act as it
stands has not imposed any limitations as envisaged in Entry 50 of List II;
d. The scope of the expression
“any limitations” under Entry 50 of List II is wide enough to include the
imposition of restrictions, conditions, principles, as well as a prohibition;
d. What is the scope of Entry
49 of List II and whether it covers a tax which involves a measure based on the
value of the produce of land? Would the constitutional position be any
different qua mining land on account of Entry 50 of List II read with Entry 54
of List I?
e. Whether Entry 50 of List II
is a specific entry in relation to Entry 49 of List II, and would consequently
subtract mining land from the scope of Entry 49 of List II?”
Determination: “f. The yield of
mineral bearing land, in terms of the quantity of mineral produced or the
royalty, can be used as a measure to tax the land under Entry 49 of List II.
The decision in Goodricke (supra) is clarified to this extent;
g. Entries 49 and 50 of List II
deal with distinct subject matters and operate in ifferent fields. Mineral
value or mineral produce can be used as a measure to impose a tax on lands
under Entry 49 of List II;
h. The “limitations” imposed by
Parliament in a law relating to mineral development with respect to Entry 50 of
List II do not operate on Entry 49 of List II because there is no specific
stipulation under the Constitution to that effect;”
Prior Decisions: “i. The decisions in India
Cement (supra), Orissa Cement (supra), Federation of Mining
Associations of Rajasthan (supra), Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills (supra), Saurashtra
Cement (supra), Mahanadi Coalfields (supra), and P Kannadasan (supra)
are overruled to the extent of the observations made in the present case.”
The minority judgment of Justice Ms. BV Nagarathna
held that royalty was in the nature of a tax, that Sections 9, 9A and 25 of the
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 denuded/ limited the
scope of Entry 50, List II and that taxes on lands and buildings contemplated taxes
directly levied on the land as a unit and did not include mineral bearing lands
within its scope. The minority judgment recognized that Entry 50, List II was
the only entry in Lists I and II which subjected the taxing power of the States
to limitations imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral
development.
The Supreme Court Observer (SCO) has an excellent page on the decision, providing links to the hearing transcripts and prior decisions. Link to SCO page on the case is here. Happy reading!
Tuesday, April 16, 2024
Bankers Thinking Twice about Funding the Nuclear Surge
Oil Price published an interesting and important news report on April 14 regarding how bankers were not willing to fund the nuclear surge world over, especially the target to triple nuclear power by 2050. It appears that bankers view the sector with considerable pessimism owing to its project risks. The Vice-President of the European Investment Bank is reported to have stated that heavy state involvement is required to make projects bankable.
So what are the implications of these from a legal point of view? How could India create a legal environment for addressing these problems? If and when India opens up the nuclear sector for private players, especially for Small and Modular Reactors, the following aspects could be thought about:
- Permitting unincorporated joint ventures to build, transfer and operate nuclear power plants, similar to petroleum exploration and production, which is also a high risk venture.
- Use of standard forms such as FIDIC and other similar forms, which will take a balanced approach.
- Effective dispute resolution through conciliation, Dispute Adjudication/ Avoidance Boards, and arbitration.
- Designing effective insurance policies to cater to risks, etc.
Thursday, April 4, 2024
Hydrogen Hubs in India: Recent Regulatory Developments
The Ministry of New & Renewable Energy (MNRE) came up with the National Green Hydrogen Mission (NGHM) in January 2023, which aimed: "to provide a comprehensive action plan for establishing a Green Hydrogen ecosystem and catalysing a systemic response to the opportunities and challenges of this sunrise sector." The NGHM recognised India's Net Zero Target of 2070 but also underscored another important but relatively less talked about target: Energy Independence by 2047. The NGHM stated that green hydrogen was seen as playing a critical role in achieving these objectives.
For the uninitiated green hydrogen refers to hydrogen produced by electrolysis using renewable energy. There are other types of hydrogen depending on the emission the process of manufacture gives out. See here, for information on such other types of hydrogen.
Hydrogen Hubs in the NGHM
The NGHM recognises that transportation of hydrogen would be a challenge, both technically and logistically, and therefore provides for cluster production, which would have the following features:
- Large scale production in a given area;
- Utilisation of the produced hydrogen also in the given area;
- Hydrogen hubs will cater to domestic demand as well as to exports
- The hub will have a network of producers, users and supporting infrastructure
- Development of hydrogen infrastructure would have to be done in a coordinated manner and by pooling resources from the Central Govt., State Govt., Local Govt. and the industry
- A hydrogen hub should have a planned/announced capacity of a minimum of 1,00,000 MTPA. Higher production capacity would get more priority under the Scheme.
- Infrastructure, projects and resources would be mapped under the PM Gati Shakti.
- Recognition of hydrogen hubs by MNRE in other places is possible but without financial assistance.
Provisions regarding failure to utilise grants or complete the project would be mentioned in the Call for Proposals.
A Steering Committee (overall monitoring of scheme) and a Project Appraisal Committee (project review) will be constituted. MNRE would nominate Scheme Implementing Agencies (SIAs) to implement the Scheme and hydrogen hubs.
Comments
It would be interesting to see how the Call for Proposals shape up and how hydrogen hubs would be created. The timelines contemplated (2025-26) is very tight. Interesting times ahead for renewables and energy security in India.
Thursday, March 28, 2024
Comment on India’s Statement at Nuclear Energy Summit Brussels 2024
Thursday, February 22, 2024
India's Planning to Attract Private Investment in Nuclear Sector to the Tune of US$ 26 Billion
In a major development, the print media reports that India is in talks with various private firms to attract investment to the tune of US$ 26 billion in the nuclear sector, in order to produce electricity from sources that do not produce carbon emissions. India plans to increase the percentage of contribution by non-fossil fuel sector in electricity generation. The current contribution of the nuclear sector and other sectors towards electricity generation is given below:
Installed Power Generation
Capacity (2023) |
||
Particulars |
Installed Capacity (MW) |
Percentage |
Fossil Fuel |
2,37,269 |
57% |
Renewable Energy |
1,73,619 |
41% |
Nuclear Power |
6,780 |
2% |
India now seeks to increase this 2%. News reports also suggest that the Government has been in talks with Reliance Industries, Tata Power, Adani Power and Vedanta to contribute about $ 5.30 billion each for investments in the nuclear sector. India is no exception: a substantial number of countries are looking at the nuclear option to meet their Net Zero commitments.
From a legal perspective, there might be a need to modify the present regulatory structure of nuclear energy in order to attract private investments (see, for instance, here). The increased focus on nuclear energy presents important opportunities, albeit long term, for law firms. Specialisation in nuclear power regulation, contracts relating to nuclear power plants, etc. will go a long way in catering to the potential market. Likewise, legal education in India could also focus on nuclear energy law, as this post notes.
Saturday, January 27, 2024
"A Employee" and the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923
The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was amended in 2009 through the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009. One of the main purposes of the amendment was to make the said law applicable to all categories of employees and to bring about a gender neutral term.
For that purpose, the Short Title to the Act was changed to "Employee's Compensation Act, 1923" instead of "Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923". The term "workman" and "workmen" were replaced with "employee" and "employees". To do so, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009 provided:
"5. Throughout the principal Act, for the words "workman" and "workmen", wherever they occur, the words "employee': and "employees" shall respectively be substituted, and such other consequential amendments as the rules of grammar may require shall also be made." (emphasis added).
In effect, Section 5 stated that wherever the term" workman" occured, it should be substituted with "employee" and corresponding grammatical changes would also be made. For instance, if the phrase "a workman relinquishes" it would have to be changed to "an employee relinquishes" although Section 5 of the the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009 calls for substitution of the term "workman" with "employee".
Unfortunately, we see in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923, as is uploaded in the India Code website that the consequential grammatical changes were not made although "workman" was substituted with "employee". Some examples of this situation is provided in the table below:
Section |
Text of the Statute |
2(1)(e) |
“when the
services of a [employee] are temporarily lent or let on hire” |
2(1)(g) |
“earning
capacity of a [employee] in any employment” |
2(1)(l) |
“incapacitates
a [employee] for all work which he was capable of performing” |
2(1)(m) |
“paid by the
employer of a [employee]” |
The Act is replete with such errors in various other provisions. This requires correction.
Thursday, January 18, 2024
India Postpones Bringing Into Effect the Digital Personal Data Protection Framework
India enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 ("DPDPA" or "Act") and the statute has been published in the Official Gazette. The Act along with the regulatory framework is yet to be brought to force. Section 1(2) of the Act reads:
"(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision."
The Central Government is yet to notify the date on which the provisions of the Act would come into force.
From media reports (here and here), it initially appeared that the Government was making rules and the same would be published and the regulatory framework would be brought into effect by January 2024. However, media reports now (here and here) suggest that the Government has postponed its decision to make the Act and the regulatory framework effective to post-elections, which are generally held in the months of April/ May.
European Data Protection Board's Coordinated Enforcement Framework
The EU EDPB (European Data Protection Board) came up with a Coordinated Enforcement Framework (CEF) in 2020 with the objective of facilitating joint actions among Supervisory Authorities under the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 2016.
The objective of the CEF was to facilitate joint actions among supervisory authorities in a coordinated manner. The legal basis of the CEF is contained in Article 61(1) read with Article 57(1)(g) of the GDPR. Article 61(1) reads:
"Supervisory authorities shall provide each other with relevant information and mutual assistance in order to implement and apply this Regulation in a consistent manner, and shall put in place measures for effective cooperation with one another. Mutual assistance shall cover, in particular, information requests and supervisory measures, such as requests to carry out prior authorisations and consultations, inspections and investigations."
Article 57(1)(g) states:
"1. Without prejudice to other tasks set out under this Regulation, each supervisory authority shall on its territory: ...
(g) cooperate with, including sharing information and provide mutual assistance to, other supervisory authorities with a view to ensuring the consistency of application and enforcement of this Regulation;"
Article 62, which deals with joint operations of supervisory authorities is also relevant for this purpose. Article 62(1) provides: "The supervisory authorities shall, where appropriate, conduct joint operations including joint investigations and joint enforcement measures in which members or staff of the supervisory authorities of other Member States are involved."
The role of EDPB is captured in Article 70(1)(u) of the GDPR, which states:
"1. The Board shall ensure the consistent application of this Regulation. To that end, the Board shall, on its own initiative or, where relevant, at the request of the Commission, in particular:...
(u) promote the cooperation and the effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of information and best practices between the supervisory authorities;"
These provisions form the legal basis for the CEF, which is basically a structure for coordinating recurring annual activities of the Supervisory Authorities under the GDPR through the EDPB.
On the CEF, the EDPB Document states: "The objective of the CEF is to facilitate joint actions in the broad sense in a flexible but coordinated manner, ranging from joint awareness raising and information gathering to an enforcement sweep and joint investigations." (Para 5).
Why is the CEF important? The ultimate aim is compliance with GDPR and protection of rights and freedoms. The CEF reduces risks of compliance in wake of new technologies in data protection.
The CEF works in the following way:
In 2022, the EDPB picked the role of Data Protection Officers for its 2023 Study. Now EDPB has come up with the report on the designation and position of Data Protection Officers, which can be accessed from here. The 2022 study was on use of cloud-based services by the public sector.
For 2024, the topic has been chosen by the EDPB in October 2023, which relates to the implementation of the right of access by controllers.
Tuesday, January 2, 2024
India & Pakistan Exchange List of Nuclear Installations under 1988 Agreement
It has been widely reported in the news media (see, for instance, here and here) that India and Pakistan have exchanged a list of nuclear installations further to a Press Release by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The Press Release notes that the exchange of lists was pursuant to an agreement which was signed on 31.12.1988, which came into force on 27.01.1991. Since then, the Release notes, both countries have exchanged lists 33 times (including the present one). This short post discusses the Agreement, known as India Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement, and the title of the Agreement is "Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities". The Non-Attack Agreement was signed in Islamabad, Pakistan.
The Non-Attack Agreement is a short one consisting of three articles. The Preamble to the Agreement recognises both countries' "commitment to durable peace and the development of friendly and harmonious bilateral relations; conscious of the role of confidence building measures in promoting such bilateral relations based on mutual trust and goodwill..."
Article 1(ii) defines "nuclear installation or facility" as including "nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, iso-topes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials." Thus, the definition is comprehensive where fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel or material in any form is used.
Article 1(i) contains the "Non-Attack" clause and states: "Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country."
Article 2 is the one which has led to parties exchanging the list of such installation/ facility. It obligates India and Pakistan to exchange lists of the latitude and longitude of nuclear installations/ facilities on the 1st January of each calendar year and includes changes in the latitude/ longitude, perhaps covering extensions/ contractions of such installations/ facilities. The language used is: "Each Contracting Party shall inform the other on 1st January of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there is any change."
Article 3 concerns ratification. It states: "This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged."
At the end of the Agreement, there is an interpretation clause. Although the Agreement is purported to be in Urdu, Hindi and English, it provides that the English text would govern in case of disputes in interpretation. It states: "Done at Islamabad on this Thirty-first day of December 1988, in, two copies each in Urdu, Hindi and English, the English text being authentic in case of any difference or dispute of interpretation."
The Non-Attack Agreement can be downloaded from here.