About the PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulations, 2010

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) is responsible for regulating the midstream and the downstream petroleum sectors (i.e., the sectors that deal with refining, processing, storage, transportation, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas) in India. 

As a part of this regulatory power (enumerated in Section 61 of the PNGRB Act, 2006), the PNGRB came up with the The PNGRB (Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)) Regulations, 2010 (ERDMP Regulations). This short post introduces the readers to these Regulations.

The consolidated ERDMP Regulations, 2010 (amended up to 2025) are available at the website of the PNGRB. Further amendments are proposed to these Regulations.

Purpose of the ERDMP Regulations: 

The ERDMP Regulations are aimed at laying down the code of practice for dealing with emergencies and disasters. The intent behind these Regulations is spelt out in Reg. 4(1) and reads:

"(a) to develop a concise and informative ERDMP to enable the entity to mitigate the emergency as quickly as possible;

(b) to prevent escalation of event both on-site and off-site;

(c) to minimize impact on people;

(d) to reduce damage to property, machinery and environment;

(e) to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an emergency and to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate with the risk;

(f) to provide an incident management organogram with clear missions and lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified command);

(g) to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process (notification, standard operating procedures);

(h) to maintain good public relations".

The ERDMP Regulations, 2010 has been amended thrice: in 2015, 2020 and 2025. 

Structure of the ERDMP Regulations:

The structure of these regulations is given below:

1. Short title and commencement 

2. Definitions 

3. Applicability 

4. Scope and intent 

4.1 Scope 

4.2 Intent 

5. The content of the regulation 

6. Classification of emergencies 

7. Implementation schedule 

8. Defaults and Consequences 

9. Requirements under other statutes 

10. Pre-Emergency Planning 

10.1 Hazard identification 

10.2 Risk analysis and risk assessment 

10.3 Causes of disasters 

10.4 Consequences 

11. Emergency Mitigation Measures 

11.1 Basic requirement of ERDMP 

11.2 Resource mobilisation 

11.3 Health, Safety and Environment Management 

12. Emergency Preparedness Measures 

12.1 Emergency Drills and Mock Exercises 

12.2 Training 

12.3 Mutual Aid 

13. Response Procedures and Measures 

14. Emergency Organization and Responsibilities 

14.1 Organization chart 

14.2 Typical Roles and Responsibilities (CIC, SIC, Coordinators) 

15. Infrastructure 

15.1 Emergency Control Centres 

15.2 Assembly Points 

16. Declaration of on-site and off-site emergencies 

17. Resources for controlling Emergency 

18. Demographic Information 

19. Medical Facilities 

20. Evacuation 

21. Information to Public 

22. Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders including external agencies 

23. Reporting of the Incident 

24. Action after reporting of incident by the entity 

25. Termination of emergency 

26. Emergency Recovery Procedures 

27. ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products and retail outlets 

28. ERDMP for road transportation 

29. Integration of the ERDMP with the National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) 

30. Security Threat Plan 

31. Miscellaneous

Schedule – I: Schedule of implementation of Code of Practice for ERDMP 

Schedule – II: List of Relevant Statutes on Management of Hazardous Substances

Schedule – III: Basic Requirements of ERDMP

Schedule – IV: Resource Mobilisation (Men and Equipment)

Schedule – V: The important Roles and Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders

Schedule – VI: INCIDENT REPORTING FORMAT

Schedule – VII: ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products

Schedule – VIII: Resource Mobilisation for Road Transportation Emergencies

Schedule – IX: Transport Emergency Card Format

Check List-1: Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)

Check List-2: Incident Prevention Measures

Check List-3: Mutual Aid/ Mock Drills 

Check List-4: ERDMP Response Measures/Infrastructure

Check List-5: Review and Updation of ERDMP

Check List-6: Availability of resources [ internal / external ]

Check List-7: ERDMP - Recovery Measures

Annexure 1: Format for Material Safety Data Sheet

Annexure 2: Emergency Response Plan during Projects or Construction

Annexure 3: Typical Mock Drill Reporting Format

Proposals to Amend the ERDMP Regulations:

On 28 November 2025, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) has invited comments on the proposed draft PNGRB (Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan) Second Amendment Regulations, 2025 ("Proposed Amendments"). 

Can the Arbitrator Lift the Corporate Veil? Yes, No & But Wait(!)

Can the Arbitrator Lift the Corporate Veil? Yes and No. Yes, if you are in Delhi and Gujarat. No, if you are in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. 

In this post, we are not concerned with lifting the corporate veil for extending an arbitration agreement to a non-signatory or at the stage of execution/ enforcement of an arbitral award, but whether an arbitral tribunal has the power to lift the corporate veil. 

The Delhi High Court has decided in a case that the arbitrator could. The Bombay and the Madras High Courts have held that they cannot. Below is a table that summarises this position:

This helpful article of 2021 summarises the legal position. Luckily, this point has been settled by the Supreme Court at least to a limited extent. Sugesan Transport, a decision of the Madras High Court is a recent addition to this list of cases where courts have held that an arbitral tribunal does not have the power to lift the corporate veil. 

In this post, we are not going to do a detailed critique of Sugesan Transport. Our objective is very limited: the purpose is to point out that precedents rendered on this aspect between Chloro Controls, 2012 INSC 436 and Cox & Kings (I), 2023 INSC 1051 should not be relied on, given the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited, 2025 INSC 616. 

In ASF Buildtech, the Supreme Court cautioned against relying on the decisions rendered further to Chloro Controls:

"31. The aversion or misconception that loomed before the various High Courts as regards the inhibition of an arbitral tribunal to resort to the principles of 'group of companies', 'alter-ego', agency etc. or to put it more simply, to implead a non-signatory to the arbitration proceedings on its own accord can be deftly traced to two pertinent observations that were made in Chloro Controls (supra).

40. Thus, due to the aforesaid, a misconception plagued the position of law that an arbitral tribunal does not have the authority or power to implead a non-signatory to the arbitration proceedings, and that only the courts are empowered to do so. It was largely in this backdrop that the decisions of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra), Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. (supra), Sudhir Gopi (supra), V.G. Santhosam (supra) and other decisions of various different High Courts came to be rendered."

The purpose of this post, as stated before, is not to examine whether Sugesan Transport was wrongly decided, but to tentatively suggest that Sugesan Transport's reliance on pre-Cox & Kings decision in Sudhir Gopi v. Indira Gandhi National Open University, 2017 SCCOnLine Delhi 8345, on this issue was not the "direct answer" (Para 20, Sugesan Transport) to the question. Perhaps, the point was not even raised by counsels. ASF Builders does not even seem to be cited in Sugesan Transport. On the broader issue of impleadment of non-signatories by the arbitral tribunal, the Supreme Court went on to hold in ASF Builders that after Cox & Kings I, even arbitral tribunals could rely on various principles laid down to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatories: 

"However, as discussed, the decision of Cox and Kings (I) (supra) has made it abundantly clear that the legal basis for the application of the 'Group of Companies' doctrine or any other principle for determining mutual consent is in the definition of "party" Under Section 2(1)(h) read with the meaning of "arbitration agreement" Under Section 7 of the Act, 1996. Since both the aforesaid provisions are not confined in their scope to either the courts or the arbitral tribunal, and rather exists ubiquitously on the statute book and is common or indifferent to both the courts and arbitral tribunals, there cannot be any gainsaying that even the arbitral tribunal now after the decision of Cox and Kings (I) (supra) could be said to be clothed with the power to take recourse to the various principles for determining mutual consent, and thereby implead a non-signatory to the arbitration, if such person is found to be bound to the arbitration agreement." (emphasis added)

In ASF Builders, the Supreme Court cited Cox & Kings (I) on the test of the Group of Companies doctrine:

"... it held that the test for determining applicability of the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine envisages a cumulative and holistic determination of the factual aspects such as the relationship between and among the legal entities within the corporate group structure, their underlying contractual obligations, the commonality of the subject matter and the composite nature of the transactions undertaken, and their overall participation in the project / subject-matter for achieving a common purpose."

The doctrine cannot be applied casually due to "mere incidental involvement in the negotiation or performance of the contract" but the inquiry must "involve a comprehensive and holistic assessment of the composite relationship among the entities concerned, the underlying transactions, and the attendant circumstances evincing mutual intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The evaluation mustbe indicative that the involvement of the non-signatory was of such manner which was sufficient to lead the other parties to legitimately believe that the non-signatory was a veritable party to the contract."

ASF Builders went several steps further: Step 1: it held that these questions need not be decided by a court exclusively and could be decided by an arbitral tribunal:

"Thus, the archaic understanding that an arbitral tribunal is incapable or incompetent to identify and implead a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement on its own accord, is not the correct position of law, in view of the decisions of this Court in In Re: Interplay (supra) and Krish Spinning (supra).We find, that the limited nature and scope of inquiry which the referral courts are expected to undertake as regards the “existence” of the arbitration agreement, would as a logical sequitur obligate the arbitral tribunal also to look into this question. Such a question, by no stretch, can be regarded as falling within the exclusive domain or jurisdiction of the referral courts, so as to render any examination of it by the arbitral tribunal a usurpation of the referral courts authority and duty."

Step 2: It also held that the arbitral tribunal was better placed to decide the question:

"76. Owing to the intrinsic character of the test — being one that entails a fact-intensive inquiry involving a mixed question of fact and law — and further, given the extensive standard it demands, requiring a comprehensive and holistic appraisal of all material facts and attendant circumstances, it may be safely concluded that the arbitral tribunal is the more appropriate and competent forum to adjudicate upon the issue of whether a non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement, as the arbitral as it has the innate advantage of going through all the relevant evidence and pleadings in greater depth and detail than the referral court at the pre-reference stage, and as such is uniquely positioned to undertake such a nuanced determination."

Step 3: ASF Builders made a distinction between existence of an arbitration agreement and binding nature vis-a-vis a non-signatory and held that question of determining whether the non-signatory was a veritable party should be left to the tribunal. Pardon the lengthy quote:

"86. Once, the “existence” of the arbitration agreement is said to have been established, the condition stipulated in terms of Section 11 sub-section (6A)of the Act, 1996, is said to have been fulfilled, and the referral courts have no option but to refer the dispute to arbitration, notwithstanding whether the intention of a non-signatory as a veritable partly to such agreement is established or not. Apart from the pre-condition of examining the “existence” of an arbitration agreement, Section 11 of the Act, 1996 does not either contemplate or require determination of the "defined legal relationship" in terms of Section 7, nor does it mandate an assessment of the futuro intention of the parties, whether signatories or non-signatories, from the "express words" of the arbitration agreement. This limited inquiry does not extend to the substantive legal consequences or implications of such arbitration agreement. The question of whether a non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement is entirely separate from the question of its "existence." The latter is a relatively straightforward, procedural determination based onthe formal presence of the agreement, whereas the former involves a substantive and contextual inquiry into the mutual intent of the parties, which may be examined by the arbitral tribunal."

Step 4: ASF Builders stated that even if this was a question of existence of an arbitration agreement, it should be left to the arbitral tribunal to decide, in line with Cox & Kings (II), 2024 INSC 670, but that the arbitral tribunal should give the non-signatory a fair opportunity (Para 107). 

Step 5: ASF Builders held that the arbitral tribunal has the power to implead non-signatories so long as "such impleadment is undertaken upon a consideration of the applicable legal principles — including, but not limited to, the doctrines of ‘group of companies’, ‘alter ego’, ‘composite transaction’, and the like —the arbitral tribunal is fully empowered to summon the non-signatory to participate in the arbitration."  (Para 109). ASF Builders also relied on Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishal Strcturals Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 507 on this point. 

Step 6: The jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal includes questions as to who is the party to the arbitration agreement. (Para 137).

Step 7: Even if notice of arbitration is not given to a non-signatory, such a non-signatory could be impleaded subsequently (Paras 158, 160). 

Now, let's come to the heart of the matter. Assume that if a person or an entity falls within the test for impleadment of a non-signatory as per Cox & Kings (I), there seem to be no reason to proscribe an arbitrator from lifting the corporate veil to see if that other person or entity is inside the veil. The inquiry into applying the Group of Companies doctrine and that of lifting the corporate veil, although not identical, could be similar in certain situations/ circumstances (See, for instance, Para 163, ASF Builders).

How is US President Trump doing What he is Doing? India and Tariffs (Part II)

In the last post titled "How is US President Trump doing What he is Doing? India and Tariffs (Part I)", we discussed how the US President imposed the "reciprocal tariffs" on India through the Executive Order 14257 of 2 April 2025 ("Order"), including Sections 1 and 2 of the Order. In this post, we continue to discuss the Executive Order 14257.

Section 3(a) of the Order:

• imposed a uniform "additional ad valorem" duty of 10 percent%, which would apply from 5 April 2025;
• imposed a "country-specific ad valorem rates of duty" as per Annex I to the Order on articles imported into the US, which was to apply from 9 April 2025;

Section 3(b) provided for exceptions from the ad valorem duties for articles mentioned in Annex II of the Order. Types of the articles forming a part of Annex II are elaborated in Section 3(b):

• (i) articles encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b); 
• (ii) articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to the duties imposed various laws and proclamations mentioned in the Order;
• (iii) automobiles and automotive parts subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant to various laws and proclamations mentioned in the Order; 
• (iv) other products enumerated in Annex II to the Order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy and energy products; 
• (v) articles from a trading partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and 
• (vi) all articles that may become subject to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 

Section 3(c) clarified that the rates established under the Order were "in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or charges applicable to such imported articles". Exceptions to this general rule were provided in Sections 3(d) and 3(e) of the Order. These exceptions were specific to Canada and Mexico. 

Section 3(f) provided that the ad valorem rates of duty in the Order applied only to non-U.S. content of a subject article where at least 20% of the value of the subject article is U.S. originating. 

The second executive order relevant for India is the Additional Tariff imposed on India for importing Russian Crude Oil through Executive Order 14329 dated 6 August 2025. The Executive Order is titled "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation" ("Russian Crude Order").

The Russian Crude Order was imposed purportedly under "the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601  et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code". 

Earlier, Executive Order 14066 (8 March 2022) titled "Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts To Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" ("Earlier Order") was issued under the Biden Administration. The Russian Crude Order was issued further to this Order.

The Russian Crude Order is titled "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation". Section 1 of this Order provides a background for the Order. It stated that the Earlier Order prevented import into the US of Russian crude oil, among other things. 

It further stated that the situation, as informed by "various senior officials" that the actions of Russia regarding Ukraine justifies continuance of national emergency described in Executive Order 14066 and that Russian actions and policies continued "to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

In order to deal with the national emergency, the Russian Crude Order stated that it was necessary and appropriate to impose additional ad valorem duty on imports from India: 

"To deal with the national emergency described in Executive Order 14066, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to impose an additional ad valorem duty on imports of articles of India, which is directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil. In my judgment, imposing tariffs, as described below, in addition to maintaining the other measures taken to address the national emergency described in Executive Order 14066, will more effectively deal with the national emergency described in Executive Order 14066." (emphasised)

Section 7(a) of the Russian Crude Order defined “Russian Federation oil” to mean "crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from the Russian Federation, regardless of the nationality of the entity involved in the production or sale of such crude oil or petroleum products." Thus, this included production and sale by Indian companies of Russian crude oil in Russia. 

Section 7(b) defined the term “indirectly importing” to include "purchasing Russian Federation oil through intermediaries or third countries where the origin of the oil can reasonably be traced to Russia, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury."

Section 2 of the Russian Crude Order is akin to a charging provision in a taxing statute. Section 2 imposed "an additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent" on articles imposed from India. The order was to be effective 21 days after 6 August 2025.

Section 3 clarified that this duty was "in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, and charges applicable to such imports".

Section 4(b) of this order stated: "Should a foreign country retaliate against the United States in response to this action, I may modify this order to ensure the efficacy of the actions herein ordered."

Section 4(c) is important. It stated that if Russia or a foreign country impacted by the Russian Crude Order take significant steps to address the national emergency, (i.e., Russian invasion of Ukraine, although not explicitly stated) "and align sufficiently with the United States on national security, foreign policy, and economic matters, I may further modify this order." (emphasised).

It is clear from this that in effect US wanted India not only to stop crude oil imports but to align with it on "national security, foreign policy and economic matters"! No wonder Indian Government reacted the way it did by showing close alignment with Russia and China.

Interestingly, the Russian Crude Order, unlike the Executive Order 14257 of 2 April 2025 (reciprocal tariff order), contained a severability clause in Section 8: "If any provision of this order or the application of any provision of this order to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other individuals or circumstances shall not be affected."

The Trump administration was probably doubtful about legality of the order and advised insertion of the severability clause.

More on the issue in another post.

How is US President Trump doing What he is Doing? India and Tariffs (Part I)

In the last post titled "Why is US President Donald Trump Doing What he is Doing? India and Tariffs" (8 September 2025), we discussed the possible rationale why US President Trump has imposed "reciprocal tariffs" on India. In this post, we address the "how" question.

President Trump issued the Executive Order 14257 of 2 April 2025 ("Order"). The Order is titled "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits". The order is approximately 71 pages. It is not sure if Indian media houses have discussed or analysed this Order. 

There is a lengthy introduction to the Executive Order, seven sections and three annexures. The Order is purported to be issued by the President of the US purportedly under the authority of the US Constitution and US Laws, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

India has been mentioned at least six times expressly in this order. On the Most Favoured Nation ("MFN") status and implications on US tariff, the Order states:

"Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not agree to bind their tariff rates at similarly low levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis. Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher." (emphasised)

In other words, this para of the Order states that while the WTO obligations relating to MFN have created a scenario where average US tariff is at only 3.3%, countries such as India impose average tariffs at 17%. Note that India's tariff is the highest among the countries mentioned, the next highest being Brazil at 11.2%. 

For those uninitiated to the concept of MFN, please see here.

The Order then goes on to state that tariffs on particular products reveal far more discrepancies than the average tariffs noted:

"Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates applied to particular products. For example, the United States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10 percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher duties on the same product. For network switches and routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff, but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent). For rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent ( ad valorem equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent)."

The statistics in the aforesaid Para are tabulated for the convenience of the readers:

It is in this background facts, among others, that the Executive Order has been passed. It needs to be examined from an Indian perspective as to whether these facts are correct and the justification for India to impose higher tariffs. 

Section 1 of the Executive Order declares national emergency and states: "I have declared a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40 percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024." This trade deficit is, according to the Order, owing not only to tariffs but also to non-tariff barriers such as "technical barriers to trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules; inadequate intellectual property protections; suppressed domestic consumption ( e.g., wage suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other regulatory standards and protections; and corruption." Section 1 also describes the consequences of these barriers:

"The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the transfer of resources from domestic producers to foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base, including in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign firms are better positioned to scale production, reinvest in innovation, and compete in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S. economic and national security."

Ultimately, these barriers are some how related to "national security" and "military readiness". "Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States."

The linkage to national security and military readiness is perhaps, owing to the need to justify the Order and safeguard against challenges, both under US and international trade laws.

Note that the focus of the Order is on domestic production, domestic manufacturing and atrophy of industrial base. Readers may like to connect it with the previous post regarding Mr. Trump's election agenda on similar lines. 

Section 1 declares national emergency. Section 2 provides for reciprocal tariff policy. It contemplates imposition of "additional ad valorem duty" on all imports, which would start at 10%. Thereafter, it would increase to the rates mentioned in Annex I to the Order. This duty would apply, according to the Order, until such time as Trump determined that the underlying conditions mentioned in the order were "satisfied, resolved, or mitigated." Annex I mentions the "Reciprocal Tariff, Adjusted" for India as 26%. 

More on the Executive Order in another post.