"I realise that some of my criticisms may be mistaken; but to refuse to criticize judgements for fear of being mistaken is to abandon criticism altogether... If any of my criticisms are found to be correct, the cause is served; and if any are found to be incorrect the very process of finding out my mistakes must lead to the discovery of the right reasons, or better reasons than I have been able to give, and the cause is served just as well."

-Mr. HM Seervai, Preface to the 1st ed., Constitutional Law of India.

Thursday, April 7, 2016

Part II: Applicability of the 2015 Arbitration Amendment Act to Arbitration Related Court Proceedings

This post is in continuation of the previous post on the applicability of the  Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 to arbitration related court proceedings that were pending as on 22.10.2015 and those proceedings initiated on or after 23.10.2015 but in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced before the said date.

In the last post, we had analysed some conflicting decisions on the point, looked at the text of Section 26 of the 2015 Act and discussed the general principles regarding retrospectivity. In this post, we look at an important decision of the Supreme Court on a similar issue that arose on enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and conclude based on the analysis of all these aspects. Readers who did not go through the previous post as this post refers to several aspects of the previous post.

Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. SAIL (1999:SC:Two Judges Bench)

In this case, disputes arose between contracting parties and was referred to arbitration which commenced prior to the 1996 Act but the award was passed when the 1996 Act was in force. The Award Holder sought enforcement of the award under the 1996 Act. Question was whether it could do so. The relevant provision was Section 85 of the 1996 Act, which is quoted below for convenience:
"55. Repeal and saving (1) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (45 of 1961) are hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, -
(a) the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Act came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after this Act comes into force;
(b) all rules made and notifications published, under the said enactments shall, to the extent to which they are not repugnant to this Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Act
."
The decision of the Supreme Court  is important for the present topic on two counts: 

(1) The  Supreme Court interpreted Section 85(2)(a) and held that notwithstanding repeal of the old arbitration enactments, including the Arbitration Act, 1940, those  provisions continued to apply in respect of arbitration related court proceedings of  arbitrations commenced prior to the coming into force of the 1996 Act.  The court stated:
This expression "in relation to" [used in the first limb of Section 85(2)(a)] has to be given full effect to, particularly when read in conjunction with the word "the provisions" of the old Act. That would mean that the old Act will apply to whole gambit of arbitration culminating in the enforcement of the award. If it was not so, only the word "to" could have sufficed and when the legislature has used the expression "in relation to", a proper meaning has to be given. This expression does not admit of restrictive meaning. First limb of Section 85(2)(a) is not a limited saving clause. It saves not only the proceedings pending at the time of commencement of the new Act but also the provisions of the old Act for enforcement of the award under that Act.”
(2) The second aspect of the decision in Thyssen is that applying the 1996 Act for enforcement of arbitral award issued under the 1940 Act would lead  to multiple problems. The Court held so while rejecting the contention that a purposive construction of the statute should be given and the 1996 Act should be  applied to enforce an award issued under the 1940 Act. The Court noted the difficulties in applying the 1996 Act to an award issued under the 1940 Act (for those interested, please see Para 39 of the decision) and held that where one construction would produce “an unjust or an inconvenient result and another would not have those effects, there is then also a presumption in favour of the latter”.

The Court also noted that since Section 85 employed the expression “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”, parties could always agree to apply  the 1996 Act for  enforcement of award under the 1940 Act.

Comparison of Section 26 of the 2015 Act and Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act

As noted in the previous post,  the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tufan Chatterjee vs Rangan Dhar and the Madras High Court in New Tirupur Area Development Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd (see previous post) have relied on Thyssen and have held that since Section 26 uses  the expression “to the arbitral proceedings” instead of “in relation to arbitral proceedings”, the legislative intent was not to apply Section 26 even to arbitration related court proceedings. This entails a comparison of both provisions (click on the image if it is too small to read):


The argument that the bar in the first limb of Section 26 is not applicable to arbitration related court proceedings in view of the usage of the phrase “to the arbitral proceedings” as opposed to “in relation to arbitral proceedings” appears attractive. But a few points are noteworthy here:

(1) The first limbs of both these provisions are of distinct character. The first limb of Section 26 is negatively worded (“Nothing contained in this Act”) and speaks exclusively of the applicability of the 2015 Act while that of Section 85(2)(a) is positively worded and speaks of applicability not of the 1996 Act but of the Acts it repealed. (The first  limbs of these  provisions could be rephrased as “this Act shall not apply” and “The repealed enactments shall apply” respectively). Hence, to compare both these  provisions and hold that the 2015 amendments applied to arbitration related court proceedings due to the absence of the phrase “in relation to” may  not  be altogether correct, especially considering  the next three points discussed below. Therefore, it may not be  correct to determine the legislative intent merely on the basis of the first  limb of Section 26. 

(2) In fact, the last limbs of both the Sections speak of applicability of the relevant Acts. On this, both the provisions are identical. Having clearly stated that the 2015 Act was applicable in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after 23.10.2015,  nothing prevented the Parliament from clearly stating that the  2015 Act applied to pending  arbitration related court proceedings of arbitrations which terminated prior to 23.10.2015. This is especially since a similar confusion arose even under the  unamended 1996 Act soon after its enactment.

(3) Going by this reasoning, 2015 Act would apply to arbitration related court proceedings of arbitrations which commenced before 23.10.2015 but terminated as per Section 32 on or after 23.10.2015 since the first limb of Section 26 talks only of arbitral proceedings and not arbitration related court proceedings, going by the rationale of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court and the Madras High Court. If the intent of the Parliament was not to apply the 2015 Amendments to  arbitral proceedings, surely  the Parliament would not have intended to apply arbitration related court proceedings unless there was a  clear intent.

(4) The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and the Madras High Court have wholly ignored the second part of the decision of the Supreme Court in Thyssen. To recollect, the Supreme Court held that if one construction of a statute would produce “an unjust or an inconvenient result and another would not have those effects, there is then also a presumption in favour of the latter”. Such a presumption can be rebutted only if the statute clearly provides otherwise. As noted previously, Section 26 does not expressly state that it applies to arbitration related court proceedings whether pending as on or which are filed on or after 23.10.2015. What are the possible adverse consequences of applying the 2015 amendments to pending arbitration related court proceedings and in respect of arbitrations commenced prior to 23.10.2015? 

Some  of such consequences are discussed below:

  • Partner X of a partnership firm files a suit in 2011 making serious allegations of fraud against Partner Y. On filing of the suit, Y immediately objects to the suit on the ground  that there is  an arbitration clause in their partnership deed  out of which  the dispute has arisen. The civil court rejected the said objection  by relying on N. Radhakrishnan v Maestro Engineers (dispute involving  allegations of fraud cannot be arbitrated) and proceeds on merits. The parties have spent several years pursuing the litigation and the arguments have been complete and the judgement has been reserved as on 22.10.2015. The 2015 Amendments  come into force on 23.10.2015. Going by the Division  Bench  of the Calcutta High Court and the Madras High  Court, the trial court should refer the matter to arbitration. It is also possible that a  similar stance could  be taken by an appellate court if an appeal is pending against a judgement of the trial court rendered before 23.10.2015 on the  same facts. This will not only lead to huge costs for the parties, it will affected the vested right of appeal against a  possible adverse decision against  Party X. Note that there is no right of  appeal against the arbitral award but only a right to challenge it on limited  grounds. [The correctness of N Radhakrishanan is irrelevant].
  • Parties to an agreement in 2013, clearly aware of BALCO, agree on a foreign seat notwithstanding that no interim relief could be sought in India. Thus, such a party is now disabled from objecting  to a petition for interim relief in Indian courts owing to Section 2(II) of the 2015  Amendment which permits a party to  a foreign seated arbitration to approach Indian courts for interim relief.  
  • Party X invokes arbitration in May  2014 and  proposes appointment of an arbitrator. Party Y objects in June 2014 to the same on the ground that the claim  is a long barred claim since the limitation period expired in 2008 and no communications  were made between the parties since 2005. Party A files a petition under Section 11 in December  2014 and the same is pending on 23.10.2015. Pursuant to Patel Engineering and National Insurance  Co., Y had the right to get the issue adjudicated by the High Court/Supreme Court, as the  case may  be, without expending fee and expenses for  appointing the arbitrator and proceeding with the arbitration. But pursuant to the amended  Section 11, a court cannot examine  such questions under Section 11 but can only refer the parties to arbitration.
  • Assume an arbitration commences in 2010 and an award is rendered in  2014. Note that the award was rendered in the SAW Pipes regime. The award is challenged in 2014 within limitation on the ground of patent illegality. During the pendency of these proceedings, the 2015 Amendment comes into force and disallows review on merits. These affect the vested rights of a party to question the award for patent illegality.
All the above examples go to show that vested rights would be affected if the 2015 Amendments are applied to arbitration related court proceedings of arbitrations which commenced prior to 23.10.2015. The Supreme Court in Thyssen sought to avoid such situations. Hence, reliance by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and the Madras High Court of Thyssen would be to apply one part of the decision and wholly ignore the other, which is unwarranted. 

Conclusion

Following are the conclusions from the aforesaid analysis:

(1) Section 26 does not expressly provide for retrospective application, that is application of the 2015 Amendments to arbitration related court proceedings pending on 23.10.2015 or which are filed on or after 23.10.2015 relating to arbitrations which commenced prior to 23.10.2015.

(2) Reliance on Thyssen to argue that Section 26 does not use the expression “in relation to” and therefore that the first limb of Section 26 did not apply to arbitration related court proceedings would be to ignore the second aspect of Thyssen by which the Supreme Court held that where one construction would produce “an unjust or an inconvenient result and another would not have those effects, there is then also a presumption in favour of the latter”.

(3) Applying amendments restrospectively to proceedings noted in point no. 1 above seem to affect vested rights. 

(4) Thyssen clearly rejected the argument that the salutary purposes/ objects  of the 1996 Act required that retrospective operation must be given to the said Act. Hence, the salutary objects of the 2015 Act may not be an answer to apply it retrospectively, given the lack of clear parliamentary mandate and the injustice caused.

Finally, look at the costs that litigating parties have to expend obtaining an authoritative decision on the applicability. There is much confusion on this question and this blawgger is sure that this issue has been raised by several hundred courts in India. The overall social cost due to the ambiguity in the statute must be enormous. All these costs, precious court hours and time could have been saved had the Parliament drafted Section 26 clearly. It appears from the Parliamentary debates (see, here) that Section 26 was a last minute addition. If the Parliament had really intended Section 26 to apply retrospectively, it should have made the provision clearer. An immediate clarificatory amendment either as an enactment or as an ordinance would be helpful in resolving the issue.

Monday, April 4, 2016

Applicability of the 2015 Arbitration Amendment Act to Arbitration Related Court Proceedings: Part I

A few months back, we had brought to the notice of the readers of this blog the legal position pertaining to the commencement of the 2015 Ordinance amending the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (see, here and  here). The Ordinance has since been enacted as an amendment Act but the same was brought into force with effect from the effective date of the Ordinance, that is, 23.10.2015.

During the period between the Ordinance and the enactment of the Amendment Act, there was a confusion as to whether the amendments applied to pending arbitral and arbitration-related court proceedings. The applicability of the amendments to these proceedings was unclear so much so that the Madras High Court directed the Ministry of Law and Justice to clarify the stand.

Pursuant thereto, an amendment was introduced in the Amendment Bill pending before the Parliament inserting Clause 26. Clause 26, which on enactment, became Section 26 reads as below:
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act."
Despite Section 26, courts differed on the applicability of the amendments to arbitration and arbitration-related court proceedings. Some of these decisions are discussed below in order to understand and highlight the divergent view points surrounding the question:

Electrosteel Castings Limited vs Reacon Engineers (India) Private Ltd. (14.01.2016) (Single Bench, Calcutta High Court):

The short question involved was whether upon filing an application for challenge the award was automatically stayed. Under the unamended Section 36, there was an automatic stay on enforcement of arbital award on filing of an application to set aside the award (“Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced…”). However, under the amended Section 36 of there is  no automatic stay [Section 36(2) of the amended Act provides: “Where an application to set aside the arbitral award  has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable…”] 

On facts, the award was passed in July 2015 and the petition for setting aside was filed in November 2015. The Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that since Section 26 did not make applicable the Amendment Act to arbitration which commenced prior to 23 October 2015, nothing in the Act applied to the arbitration, which was the subject matter of challenge.

Tufan Chatterjee vs Rangan Dhar (Division Bench, Calcutta High Court-02.03.2016):

A Division Bench of the High Court heard an appeal on the question as to whether a court could entertain an application for interim relief under Section 9 of the 1996 Act post 23 October 2015 even if it was filed before the said date.  The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held in the negative. Among other things, the court’s rationale was based on the use of the phrase “arbitral proceedings” in Section 26. The Court held that arbitral proceedings commenced with notice invoking arbitration (or as provided under Section 21 and terminated as per Section 32 by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under Section 32(2). Hence, Section 26 did not apply to proceedings initiated under Section 9. The Court held:
A careful reading of the provisions of the 1996 Act, and in particular Sections 21 and 32 thereof, makes it amply clear that the expression 'arbitral proceedings' in Section 26 of the Amendment Act of 2015 cannot be construed to include proceedings in a Court under the provisions of the 1996 Act, and definitely not any proceedings under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, instituted in a Court before a request for reference of disputes to arbitration is made.”
Nitya Ranjan Jena vs Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. (Single Judge, Calcutta High Court-02.03.2016):

The question was whether an apply for stay of award had to be filed in respect of an arbitral award which was challenged before 23 October 2015. The Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held in the negative:
Having considered the respective submissions advanced by the parties and upon perusing the substituted section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which has been introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, it appears that this provision has no manner of application at all in view of the specific provision as contained under section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.”

According to a law firm update, the Madras High Court has held that Section 26 did not apply to post-arbitral proceedings. The court, reportedly, based its rationale on two grounds: (1) Section 26 did not deal with arbitration related court proceedings but specifically dealt with only “arbitral proceedings”; (2) Section 85(2)  of the 1996 Act used the phrase “in relation to arbitral proceedings” while stating that notwithstanding the repeal of the pre-1996  arbitration related legislations, such legislations applied “in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before” the 1996 Act came into force. The Supreme Court in Thyssen Stahl Union GMBH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd had held that the phrase “in relation to arbitral proceedings” covered even arbitration-related court proceedings. According to the Madras High Court, since Section 26 uses the phrase “to the arbitral proceedings” rather than “in relation to arbitral proceedings”. Consequently, the Madras High Court, reportedly, held that with regard to pending petitions for setting aside arbitral awards, there would be no stay. 

It is not clear from the law firm update as to whether the court held that the judgement applied  even in case of applications which were filed prior to 23 October 2015.

Jumbo Bags v New India Assurance Ltd. (10.03.2016, Single Judge- Madras High Court):

In Jumbo Bags v New India Assurance Ltd. (10.03.2016, Single Judge- Madras High Court), the question was whether procedure for appointment of arbitrators should be followed as per the unamended Act or the amended Act when the notice of arbitration was issued in July 2015. The Chief Justice held that since arbitration commenced under the unamended Act, the procedure to be followed is as per the unamended Act.

Analysis

It was widely reported that that Madras High Court had sought clarifications in Delphi TVS Diesel Systems Ltd v. Union of India (24.11.2015) from the Central Government on the prospective or retrospective applicability of the 2015 Amendments. Specifically, the High Court sought clarifications on the reason for non-introduction of Section 85A proposed by the Law Commission of India in its 246th Report dealing comprehensively with the temporal applicability of the amendments. For the ease of reference, Section 85A proposed by the Law Commission is provided below:
Transitory provisions .—(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amending) Act, 2014, the provisions of the instant Act (as amended) shall be prospective in operation and shall apply only to fresh arbitrations and fresh applications, except in the following situations -
(a) the provisions of section 6-A shall apply to all pending proceedings and arbitrations.
Explanation: It is clarified that where the issue of costs has already been decided by the court/tribunal, the same shall not be opened to that extent.
(b) the provisions of section 16 sub-section (7) shall apply to all pending proceedings and arbitrations, except where the issue has been decided by the court/tribunal.
(c) the provisions of second proviso to section 24 shall apply to all pending  arbitrations.
(2) For the purposes of the instant section,—
(a) "fresh arbitrations" mean arbitrations where there has been no request for appointment of arbitral tribunal; or application for appointment of arbitral tribunal; or appointment of the arbitral tribunal, prior to the date of enforcement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amending) Act, 2014.
(b) "fresh applications" mean applications to a court or arbitral tribunal made subsequent to the date of enforcement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amending) Act, 2014
.”
It is noteworthy that most of the amendments suggested applied to only to fresh arbitrations and applications. 

There is no quarrel in all the decisions cited above regharding the applicability of the  2015 Amendment to arbitration proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015. The fundamental question is whether the amended Act applied to arbitration related court proceedings which were initiated before 23.10.2015 and were pending as on that date and to such proceedings initiated on or after 23.10.2015.

The Text

In order to find an answer to the aforesaid question, it is important to analyse the text of Section 26. 
Section 26 of the 2015 Act contains three fundamental elements: 

(1) It states that the Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act. This is the last limb of Section 26. Note that it states that the Act shall apply “in relation to” arbitral proceedings. 
(2) Section 26 states that none of the  provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015.  This is the first limb of Section 26.
(3) The provision also states that the 2015 Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced before  23.10.2015 if the  parties so agree. This is the second limb of Section 26.

[The order in which Section 26 is analysed above is significant for the reason set out  at the last part of this post]

Following are the inferences that one could reasonably make from the aforesaid analysis:

(1) Section 26 uses two different phrases “to the arbitral proceedings” and “in relation to the arbitral proceedings”.
(2) Section 26 does not contain a specific provision akin to Section 85A recommended by the Law Commission.
(3) Section 26 does not specifically/ expressly deal with the prospective/ retrospective applicability of the 2015 Amendments to arbitration related court proceedings.

Given that there is no express mention regarding pending arbitration related court proceedings as on 23.10.2015 or applications filed on or after  23.10.2015 pertaining to arbitral proceedings commenced before the said date, it is important to rely on settled legal principles on retrospective applicability of statutes, which are given below (GP  Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 2012, p. 532ff):

(1) Every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective. 
(2) Unless there are words in the statute which show the intent to affect existing/ vested rights, the  statutes are deemed to be prospective.
(3) Statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually admissible.
The third principle here is extremely relevant and needs elucidation and  principles related thereto are listed out below.
(4) No person has a vested right in the matter of procedure, such as, for instance, if a court has did not have jurisdiction to  try a suit at the time of filing but had jurisdiction at the time of disposal, the court cannot refuse to try the suit for want  of jurisdiction
(5) While the law relating to forum are matters of procedure, the law relating to right of action and right to  appeal are considered substantive rights even though they  are remedial  in nature. Hence, a procedural statute should  not be applied retrospectively when it would create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions already  accomplished.
(6) It appears that English law has been moving in favour of the doctrine of fairness (rather than in wholly relying on the substance/ procedure distinction, which in any case is amorphous). Retrospectivity should be judged, according to the doctrine, after taking  into account several factors such as the value of rights affected, extent to which such value is diminished, clarity of language used, and the circumstances in which legislation was passed.

Having analysed the issue at  hand and the general principles, we would analyse the  consequences of retrospective application of the 2015 Amendments in the next post.