"I realise that some of my criticisms may be mistaken; but to refuse to criticize judgements for fear of being mistaken is to abandon criticism altogether... If any of my criticisms are found to be correct, the cause is served; and if any are found to be incorrect the very process of finding out my mistakes must lead to the discovery of the right reasons, or better reasons than I have been able to give, and the cause is served just as well."

-Mr. HM Seervai, Preface to the 1st ed., Constitutional Law of India.

Friday, February 21, 2014

Voltas v. Rolta India: A Comment

The Supreme Court has been very busy this year in the arbitration front. An example of this is the decision of the court in Voltas Ltd. v. Rolta India Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 2073/2014 arising out of SLP (Civil) no. 30015/2013 dt. 14.02.2014).

Facts:
Voltas Ltd. ("Voltas") and Rolta India Ltd. ("Rolta") entered into a construction contract for the construction of two buildings and modification of an existing building. Disputes arose between the parties and Rolta terminated the contract in December 2004.

In March 2005, Rolta communicated to Voltas that it is yet to compute the losses, damages, etc., after the building work is over and that it would claim the same from Voltas. Voltas replied in April 2005 that it was not liable for damages. In the same month, Rolta wrote to Voltas stating that it was not liable to pay any compensation and that it had suffered huge losses and damages and incurred heavy costs for which Voltas was responsible. Rolta also stated that it had the right to take approprirate steps as per agreement. Voltas invoked arbitration in March 2006 for the adjudicaiton of the dispute. Several correspondences between the parties ensued and ultimately Rolta raised claims under several heads vide its letter in April 2006. Against the said letter, Voltas denied liability in May 2006. Since an arbitrator was not appointed by Rolta, Voltas approached the Bombay High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) and the Bombay High Court ordered appointment of an arbitrator in November 2010.

The arbitrator entered reference and Voltas filed its Statement of Claim claiming about 23.31 crores plus interest. Rolta filed a counter claim for Rs. 333 crores with interest. In the counter-claim, Rolta stated that it had sent a demand letter in April 2006 claiming several amounts which were subsequently raised in its counter-claims.

Against the counter-claims, Voltas objected stating that the counter claims were not maintainable and was barred by limitation. The arbitrator had to decided (1) whether the counter claim or a part thereof was barred by limitation, and (2) whether the counter claim was not maintainable and beyond the scope of reference. The arbitrator overruled the objections regarding maintainability of counter claims but held that the counter-claims were barred by time in the Interim Award.

Against the said Award, Rolta filed an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Single Judge upheld the Interim Award. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that the counter-claim was filed within limitation. The Division Bench held that since a demand was made by Rolta in April 2006 for Rs. 68.63 crores, the period from May 2006 till 2010 during which the Section 11 proceedings were pending had to be excluded. Voltas appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision:
After hearing the contentions of the parties, the Supreme Court held that the correspondences between the parties after termination in December 2004 had an implication on the ultimate decision. Pursuant to the termination letter, Voltas replied requesting payment for its final bill. The court held that Rolta had already crystallised its claims against Voltas in March 2005 where in claimed Rs. 68.63 crores and threatented to invoke arbitration if Voltas did not pay the said amount within seven days. Further in reply to Rolta's April 2006 letter, Voltas' counsel had replied in April 2006 that since their client had gone abroad, an arbitrator would be appointed within thirty days from their client's return. The Supreme Court considered these communications to indicate that Rolta had crystallised its claims by then. Further, Rolta's letter in April 2006 containing the claims in detail clearly indicated the amounts allegedly due from Voltas. According to the Supreme Court, these communications had indicated that Rolta "had particularised or specified its claims and sought arbitration for the same."

On State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (blog post on the decision can be accessed from here), the Court held that the court carved out an exception to the normal rule that in case of counter-claims, the date of filing counter-claims in the arbitration would be the date of its institution. According to the Court, the exception was that in case the respondent against whom arbitration was invoked had also made a claim against the claimant and sought arbitration by serving a notice to the claimant but subsequently raises that claim made previously as a counter claim, the date of institution of such counter-claim would be the date of service of notice of such claim and not the date of filing of the counter claim. Since the counter-claim was made in April 2006 itself, the same was within limitation.

Against the contention that the counter-claim of Rolta had to be restricted to 68.63 crores against the counter-claim of Rs. 333 crores filed by Rolta, the court accepted the submission and held that the exception contemplated in Praveen Enterprises saved only those counter claims which were claimed previously through the notice and not those in addition to such claims. The court also held that a time barred claim cannot be asserted after the prescribed period of limitation.

Consequently, the court modified the decision of the Division Bench and allowed counter-claims to be made in respect of Rs. 68.63 crores. 

Thursday, February 6, 2014

WSG (Mauritius) v MSM Satellite: A Descriptive Comment

Recently, a two judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India had the occasion in WSG (Mauritius) Ltd. v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd (pdf) (24.01.2014) to deal with the issue as to whether an Indian court has the power to restrain foreign arbitral proceedings.

Brief Facts:
Appellant WSG (Mauritius) Ltd., or (WSG) and the Respondent MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd or (MSM) entered into a Deed for Provision of Facilitation Services (Facilitation Deed or Deed). The Deed provided for arbitration under ICC Rules in Singapore. Under the Deed, MSM made payment to the tune of Rs. 125 crores to WSG and was allegedly obligated to pay a total of Rs. 425 crores. On 25 June 2010, MSM rescinded the Deed for the reason that the Deed was voidable on grounds of misrepresentation and fraud.

MSM also filed a suit on the same date in the Bombay High Court for declaration that the Deed was void and for recovery of Rs. 125 crores already paid to WSG. After three days, MSM sent a request for arbitration to ICC. On 30 June 2010, MSM filed another suit for declaration that since the Deed was rescinded, WSG was not entitled to invoke arbitration under the arbitration clause in the Deed. In the said suit, an application for temporary injunction restraining WSG from continuing with the arbitral proceedings was filed.

On 9 August 2010, the Single Judge dismissed the application for temporary injunction on the ground that it was for the arbitrator to consider whether the Facilitation Deed was void and the court could not intervene in matters governed by the arbitration clause. MSM challenged the said order before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge and passed an order of temporary injunction restraining WSG from continuing the arbitral proceedings.

[Note that Para 7 of the SC decision states that the order was passed “restraining the arbitration by ICC”. This is erroneous. The order was passed not against ICC but against WSG from continuing the ICC arbitration.] WSG appealed to the Supreme Court.

Contentions:
On Behalf of WSG:

1) Bombay High Court has no jurisdiction to order temporary injunction restraining foreign seated arbitration between Non-Indian residents.

2) Clause 9 of the Deed provided that any party may seek equitable relief in a Singaporean court or any other court having jurisdiction. On the basis of principle of comity of courts, the Bombay High Court should have refused to interfere with the matter and should have allowed the parties to resolve the dispute through ICC arbitration.

3) Unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement, which is the agreement specified under Section 45 is null and void Under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act or 1996 Act), the court is obligated to refer a dispute arising out of an agreement specified in Section 44 of the Act to arbitration, unless the court finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed., the court cannot entertain a dispute covered by the arbitration agreement and refer the parties to arbitration.

4) The court should not examine whether the entire Deed was void but only whether the Arbitration Agreement was vitiated by fraud/ misrepresentation.

5) Since WSG is the party against which fraud/ misrepresentation was alleged, as per Abdul Kadir’s case which was relied on in Maestro Engineers case, the party against which fraud was alleged could ask the court to go into the issue to resolve it. In this case, it is for WSG to request the court to deal with the dispute and not MSM.

6) Further, Maestro Engineers was rendered in the context of domestic arbitration and not foreign arbitration. The language of Section 45 differed radically from Section 8, under which Maestro Engineers was decided. Under Section 45, MSM had not made out that the arbitration agreement was null and void Under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act or 1996 Act), the court is obligated to refer a dispute arising out of an agreement specified in Section 44 of the Act to arbitration, unless the court finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

7) Clause 9 of the Deed is not opposed to public policy under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Bombay High Court had wrongly held that Clause 9 foreclosed open trial as Exception 1 to Section 28 clearly exempts arbitration agreements. There was no fraud or misrepresentation by WSG before the Deed was signed.

8) An agreement which is voidable is not the same as an agreement which is void. Hence, the Division Bench should have referred the parties to arbitration.

On Behalf of MSM:

1) The Facilitation Deed which also contains the arbitration clause, is void for fraud and misrepresentation.

2) Section 45 prohibits reference of a Deed that is null and void on account of fraud and misrepresentation. In view of the same, the court will have to decide whether the Deed was null and void.

3) As per Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, the Bombay High Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit .

4) There is no bar in Section 45 restraining the High Court from trying the said suit.

5) Indian and English Law empowered the court to restrain parties from proceedings with the parties. Some relevant decisions are VO Tractoroexport v. Tarapore & Co. [(1969) 3 SCC 562)], ONGC v. Western Co. of North America [(1987) 1 SCC 496], Claxton Engg v. Txam Olajaes Gaz Kutai Ktf [2011] EWHC 345 (Comm.).

6) As held in Chloro Controls v. Severn Trent Water Purification, Section 45 mandates the court to determine the validity of the agreement at the threshold itself and a decision on the issue will be a futile exercise before the arbitrator. Section 45 requires the court to not only consider the a challenge to the arbitration agreement but also a challenge to the substantive contract [SMS Tea Estates v. Chandmari Tea Co. (2011) 14 SCC 66].

7) Where allegations of fraud are made out prima facie, the judicial trend is to have the same adjudicated in court (Abdul Kadir’s case, Maestro Engineers case). In fact, the Madras High Court held in HG Oomor Sait v. O Aslam Sait (2001) 3 CTC 269 (Mad) (referred to in Maestro Engineers case) even if the party against whom allegations of fraud are made requires reference to arbitration, the matter is to be adjudicated by the court.

8) The case establishes prima facie that fraud has been committed not only on MSM but also on BCCI which is a public body (Zee Telefilms v. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 2677). If the arbitration is allowed to go on, interests of BCCI will also be affected. Further, having regard to the magnitude of fraud, such allegations can only by inquired by the court and not the arbitrator.

Decision of the Court:

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was correct in passing the injunction restraining the Singaporean arbitration. The decision is summarized below:

1) It is not correct to contend that the Bombay High Court would not have the jurisdiction to restrain arbitral proceedings in Singapore merely due to the principle of comity.

2) The principle of comity merely provides that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction not as a matter of obligation but out of mutual respect. It does not mean that India should not assume jurisdiction of foreign arbitral proceedings out of mutual respect or deference to foreign courts.

3) Therefore, an appropriate civil court in India as provided in Section 9, CPC would have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass orders as per Section 9 and also Clause 9 of the Deed.

4) The Deed, including the arbitration clause, was executed by WSG in Mumbai, the alleged fraudulent inducement of MSM to enter into the Deed occurred in Mumbai, the rescission of the Deed was also issued from Mumbai. Hence, the cause of action for the purpose of Section 20 of the CPC arose within the jurisdiction of the courts at Mumbai.

5) A civil court which entertains a suit has to follow the mandate of Section 45, Chapter I Part II of the 1996 Act. S. 45 makes it clear that notwithstanding anything stated in Part I of the Act or the CPC, when a civil court is seized of a matter in respect of which parties have entered into an agreement specified in S. 44 of the 1996 Act, such court shall refer the parties to arbitration. This provision is applicable even when no application is made by a party to refer the matter to arbitration. In the present case even though no application has been filed by WSG to refer parties to arbitration, it has stated in its affidavit that the Singapore arbitration has already been invoked.

6) The exception to the above rule is that when the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. For instance, if an agreement containing an arbitration clause is unstamped, the court cannot refer the matter to arbitration but if such agreement is unregistered, the court can do so since the arbitration agreement is a collateral term of the main contract (SMS Tea Estates case).

7) Thus, the court will have to examine in each case if the arbitration agreement is void, unenforceable or inoperative along with the main agreement or whether the arbitration agreement stands apart from the main agreement and is not null and void (Premium Nafta Products v. Fili Shipping Co., UK House of Lords).

8) In the facts, MSM stated that the Deed was voidable at its option for false representation and fraud. This does not in any way affect the arbitration agreement contained in the Deed, which is independent and separate. Hence, the Division Bench was wrong in refusing to refer the parties to arbitration.

9) Arbitration agreement does not become inoperative or incapable of being performed where allegations of fraud have been made. Maestro Engineers and Abdul Kadir’s case were decisions rendered in the context of domestic arbitration and not arbitrations under Chapter I of Part II. In the latter cases, the court can refuse to refer the matter to arbitration only if the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being fraud, and not on the ground that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation have to be gone into.

10) Exception 1 to S. 28 Indian Contract Act clearly saves Clause 9 of the Deed. Further, right to jury is not available under Indian laws and therefore, Clause 9 is in hit by Ss 23 and 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

11) Section 45 does not empower a court to decline reference to arbitration on the ground that another suit on the same issue is pending before an Indian Court.

12) Since Clause 9 of the Deed is wide enough to cover the dispute between the parties, the order of the Single Judge referring the parties to ICC Arbitration is restored.

A critique of the decision shall be the subject of a future post. In the meanwhile, readers may read the following comments on the case:



Monday, February 3, 2014

Three Lessons on Humility

As a legal practitioner, we come across presiding officers with various capabilities, expertise in varying degrees on various but not all laws. Often we as legal practitioners come across presiding officers who may not be experts in the subject matter which he has to decide on. In such circumstances, the way in which the legal practitioner appeals to the common sense of the judge becomes extremely important. This post deals with three  incidents which this blawgger came across.

Story 1:  One of the most sought after senior advocate in Mumbai calls a law firm. The receiptionist of the firm picks up the phone. The senior advocate introduces himself: "I am ***** *******, advocate of the Bombay High Court. I would like to speak to **********. Is he available?" 

For those who did not get the point, see that he did not use the term "senior"in the short conversation!

Story 2: In an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator is not a legally trained person but an official with three decades worth experience in commercial contracts. The advocate (who is from Bangalore) is to argue in support of a petition for summoning an official of the other side. The advocate structures his arguments in the following manner:

(1) The advocate first sums up the structure of his argument
(2) He then states in layman's terms the purport and the purpose of the application.
(3) He states in clear layman's terms the law. While doing so, he cites the submission of the other side in terms of the law.
(4) Lastly he submits the practical difficulty his side would face if the application is not allowed. 

Story 3: In a domestic arbitration proceeding before a non-lawyer arbitrator, the advocate of one side while putting forth his arguments starts off with legal terms and arbitration jargon such as pre-arbitral procedure, arbitrability, etc which the arbitrator had no clue about! God only knows the fate of his application.

The lesson from Story 2 and 3 is that one should realise that throwing attitude about how much one knows may not serve the purpose. A legal practitioner's duty is to support the case of his client, not to show the presiding officer how cool he is! If we forget this, we may not be in a position to support the case of our client, for reasons that may not even be remotely connected to the merits of the case. 

Wednesday, January 1, 2014

Purchase Preference to Public Sector Enterprises: A Short History

This brief post summarises the evolution of the Law on Purchase Preference to Public Sector Enterprises. The purpose of this is to act as a first reference point to researchers interested in the subject.
 
Since 1992, the Government of India has been following the Purchase Preference Policy.[1] Under the said Policy, the Department of Public Enterprises, Government of India had sought to liberalise the industrial policy of India and stressed on the need for improvement of the performance of public enterprises based on commercial principles. The Government deemed protection of public enterprises through price or purchase preference was not in accordance with the liberalised industrial policy. Therefore, the Department of Public Enterprises recommended replacing the then prevailing price preference with purchase preference in public procurement. Under purchase preference, where the price quoted by a public enterprise in public procurement was within 10 per cent of the lowest bidder (L1) price, ceterus paribus, purchase preference may be granted to the said public enterprise concerned provided it was willing to match the L1 price, that is, supply at the price quoted by the lowest bidder.
 
This policy was transitory and was operable for three years. The Notification providing for Purchase Preference Policy also recommended that price/ purchase preference policy had to be done away with within three years from the date of its issue, that is, January 1995, by which time, the public enterprises were to adjust to the new environment of competition and efficiency. However, the policy was extended in 1995 up to March 1997[2] and in October 1997 up to March 2000.[3]
 
The 1997 notification restricted the purchase preference to manufactured items produced by public sector enterprises or joint ventures with public sector enterprises where the purchase was in excess of Rs. five crore. Further, the notification clarified in that in case of joint ventures with public enterprises, there had to be a value addition of at least 20 per cent by the public sector enterprises in the item manufactured. In February 1998, it was clarified that the above notification was applicable even in case of services provided by public sector enterprises.[4]
 
The purchase preference was again extended in 2000[5], 2002[6], 2004[7] and 2005[8], subject to certain conditions. The 2005 extension was to be effective till March 2008. However, the policy was reviewed pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Caterpillar India Pvt. Ltd. v. Western Coalfields Ltd.[9] In the said decision, it was contended by the Appellant that the 2005 guidelines make purchase preference mandatory as compared to the previous guidelines which used permissive language in respect of purchase preference. Further complaint was raised regarding the efficacy of such a policy which granted monopoly to public sector enterprises. Consequently, the Supreme Court issued the following guidelines in the case:
  • The concerned ministries are directed to consider the issues raised by the Appellant and to consider We, therefore, direct that industry-wise assessment be done and to perform an industry-wise assessment of the need for preference. Where there is cost-effectiveness in a public sector enterprise, there is no need to give preference over others. 
  • The assessment should also decide whether and to what extent there should be preference so as to ensure a level playing field. If purchase preference is required, the margin of preference should be fixed.
  • Further, if the object of the tender is to invite foreign direct investment, the impact of purchase preference on such investment should be considered.
  • The extent of discretion is to be given as to whether the purchase preference should be followed or not should be re-introduced.
  • The above exercise is to be undertaken by the concerned ministries within four months from the date of the judgement. 
  • In the interim, the present policy shall continue to apply till the issue is reconsidered afresh by the concerned departments of the Government of India.
  •  While fixing the norms, the capacity of a party to deliver the subject matter of the contract and that of the competitors should be taken note of.
 Consequently, the DPE revisited its previous notifications and came up with the fresh notification in November 2007[10] and instructed the following:
  • The Purchase Preference Policy would terminate with effect from 31.03.2008.
  • This decision would not affect the Purchase Preference Policy framed for specific sectors by the relevant Ministry/ Department.
  • The Concerned Ministry/ Department would be entitled to evolve/ review preferential policies for the sectors of their concern, as per their requirement.
In view of the above notification, the Purchase Preference Policy ceased to be effective from 31.03.2008. Consequently, the CVC Instructions issued in March 2009 exempt the Purchase Preference Policies as made by the relevant Ministries/ Departments from the ban on post-tender negotiations.
 

[1] Office Memorandum No. DPE/13(19)/91-Fin.dated 13 January 1992, available at
[2] DPE OM NO.DPE/13(19)/91-Fin. dated 15 March 1995
[3] DPE OM NO.DPE/13(19)/91-Fin. dated 31 October 1997, available at
[4] DPE OM No.DPE/13(19)/91-Fin. dated 10 February 1998, available at
[5] DPE OM No. DPE/13(3)/2000-Fin.-GL-30 dated 14 September 2000, available at
and DPE O.M. No.DPE/13(3)/2000-Fin. dated 30 October 2000, available at
[6] DPE OM No. DPE/13(1)/2002-Fin. dated 14 June 2002, available at
[7] DPE O.M. No.DPE/13(12)/2003-Fin. dated 26th October 2004, available at
[8] DPE OM No. DPE.13(12)/2003-Fin. Vol. II dated the 18th July 2005, available at
[9] AIR 2007 SC 2971: (2007) 11 SCC 32: MANU/SC/7685/2007
[10] DPE OM No. DPE/13(15)/2007-Fin dated 21st November 2007, available at