National Law School of India Review - Call for submissions

Call for Submissions - National Law School of India Review, Vol. 28(1)

The National Law School of India Review (NLSIR) is now accepting submissions for its upcoming issue- Volume 28(1).  The most recent issue of the NLSIR, Vol. 27(1), will feature contributions by Dr. Catherine Seville, Reader, Newnham College, University of Cambridge, Dr. Wayne Courtney, Associate Professor, University of Sydney, and Prof. Afra Afsharipour, Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law among several others. Moreover, in August 2009, NLSIR attained the unique distinction of being the only Indian student-run law journal to be cited by the Supreme Court of India, in Action Committee, Un-Aided Private Schools v. Director of Education. NLSIR has also recently been cited in Justice R. S. Bachawat's Law of Arbitration and Conciliation, a leading treatise on arbitration law in India. 

Papers may be submitted under the following categories:

1.    Long Articles: Between 5000 and 8000 words, inclusive of footnotes. Papers in this category are expected to engage with the theme and literature comprehensively, and offer an innovative reassessment of the current understanding of that theme. It is advisable, though not necessary, to choose a theme that is of contemporary importance. Purely theoretical pieces are also welcome.

2.    Essays: Between 3000 and 5000 words, inclusive of footnotes. Essays are far more concise in scope. These papers usually deal with a very specific issue, and argue that the issue must be conceptualized differently. They are more engaging, and make a more easily identifiable, concrete argument.

3.    Case Notes and Legislative Comments: Between 1500 and 2500 words, inclusive of footnotes. This is an analysis of any contemporary judicial pronouncement or a new piece of legislation whether in India or elsewhere. The note must identify and examine the line of cases in which the decision in question came about, and comment on implications for the evolution of that branch of law. In case of legislative comment the note must analyze the objective of the legislation and the legal impact the same is expected to have.

Authors are requested to note that pieces engaging with a foreign theme or legal development,  in any of the above categories, should also explain its relevance in the Indian context, whether by virtue of similar laws or otherwise.

Submissions are preferred in Times New Roman font, double-spaced. Main text should be in font size 12 and footnotes in font size 10. All submissions must be in doc.x format. The review uses only footnotes (and not end-notes) as a method of citation. Submissions must conform to the Bluebook (19th edn.) system of citation.

The NLSIR only accepts electronic submissions. All submissions should contain the name of the author, professional information, the title of the manuscript, and contact information. The last date for submissions to Volume 28(1) is November 30, 2015. Submissions may be emailed to mail.nlsir@gmail.com under the subject heading '28(1) NLSIR - Submissions'.

Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi: A Judgement Eagerly Awaited

One of the most closely watched cases in the recent times from a commercial law perspective is the case of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi pending before the UK Supreme Court. The hearings were complete on 23.07.2015 and the decision of the court is awaited. The issues involved in the case are the following:

1. Whether the rule against penalties applies to commercial contracts between sophisticated parties.
2. If the rule does apply to such contracts, whether clauses 5.1 and 5.6 are within the scope of the rule.
3. If the clauses are within the scope of the rule against penalties, whether the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that they were penal and therefore unenforceable.

The most interesting thing about the case is the Appellant principal that the rule against penalties should cease to be applicable is not only in respect of commercial contracts between sophisticated parties which were negotiated at arm's length but the Appellant questions the whole doctrine against penalties itself. The decision would have huge ramifications in international commerce. See the UK SC page on the case. The vidoes of the hearings beginning from the hearing held on 21.07.2015 are available here. The videos depict a fascinating picture of how hearings take place in the UK SC.

Hat tip: The UK SC Blog

Indian Journal of Arbitration Law: Call for Papers

Call for papers from the IJAL (Indian Journal of Arbitration Law)

Call for Papers

The Indian Journal of Arbitration Law is a biannual, student reviewed Journal by the Centre for Advanced Research and Training in Arbitration Law of National Law University, Jodhpur.

National Law University, Jodhpur, one of the premier law schools in India, is taking successful initiatives for the promotion of areas related to the specialized fields of law. To strengthen the promotion of knowledge, research and legal interaction in the subject of arbitration law, it has established the Centre for Advanced Research and Training in Arbitration Law. The Indian Journal of Arbitration Law is one such initiative of this centre towards the development of this expert legal arena.

The Journal strives to inculcate the prevalent theories in the field of arbitration with their practical relevance. The editorial board seeks to achieve this feat by including contributions from individuals with varied expertise of practicing arbitration and by focusing on developing trends. In this regard, the board would give due emphasis to the rich thought processes of students of law, who bring to the forefront the innovative academic research currently underway in most law schools all over the world. Inclusion of changing regional trends will play a vital part in understanding the scope and extant of this discipline and would therefore find due importance in the Journal.

The Indian Journal of Arbitration Law is pleased to announce its upcoming issue (Volume 4: Issue 2), which is to be published in January, next year. As this issue will have no theme, submissions can be on any contemporary issue.

The Board of Editors cordially invites original, unpublished submissions for publication in the following categories:

- Articles

- Notes

- Comments

- Book Reviews

Manuscripts may be submitted via email to editor.cartal@gmail.com latest by 30th September, 2015.

For further details regarding Editorial policy and submission guidelines please visit the website here.

Undue Delay Per Se is Not a Ground for Setting Aside Award

Recently, the English High Court (Commercial Court) had the occasion to consider the question whether delay in publishing the award after completion of hearings was a ground for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996. In BV Scheepswerf Damen Gorinchem v. The Marine Institute [2015] EWHC 1810 (Comm)], the arbitrator passed the award 376 days after the completion of the hearings. The losing party in the arbitration (“Damen”) challenged the award for the reason that the arbitrator had committed serious irregularity as provided under Section 68 primarily on three counts:

(1) the tribunal failed to comply with its general duty of avoiding unnecessary delay,
(2) the tribunal’s delay led to breach of Clause 20 of the applicable arbitral rules which provided that the award should “normally be made available within not more than six weeks from the close of the proceedings”, and
(3) owing to the delay, the tribunal failed to deal with all the issues that were put to it.

The Commercial Court, after analyzing the legal principles involved held the following:

(a) Section 68 deals with serious failures by the tribunal to comply with due process which should result in substantial injustice to the applicant. This “higher threshold” eliminates technical and unmeritorious challenges.

(b) Unless, it is shown that such serious irregularity resulted in substantial injustice to the applicant, the award cannot be set aside.  Damen had to show that but for the undue delay, the arbitrator might have reached a different conclusion more favourable to Damen.

(c) Damen’s reliance on authorities dealing with delays in courts is inappropriate as the authorities related to findings of fact but in Section 68 cases, the applicant cannot attack the tribunal’s findings on facts.

(d) This restriction (bar on review of findings of fact) on a court does not cease to exist merely because there is an inordinate delay in passing the arbitral award.

(e) Closer scrutiny of awards on the basis of delay is problematic because there is no principled basis to judge delay. For instance, it is a question whether three months or four months would constitute delay. Further, if the arbitrator delayed the award due to illness which was recorded in the Award itself, would such an award also invite closer scrutiny?

(f) However, merely because a party does not complain about the delay of the arbitrator before the award is issued, such failure will not result in a waiver or the right to complain about the delay after the award is issued.

(g) If the award has dealt with all the issues and is therefore impeachable otherwise, it does not matter if it was passed twelve months after the hearing.

(h) Once the arbitrator has dealt with a particular issue, the award cannot be challenged for the quality of the tribunal’s reasoning.

On the basis of the aforesaid reasons, the court rejected the Application although it held that the delay in passing the award was “extremely regrettable”.

Comment:

Arbitrators are obligated to pass awards within a reasonable time after completion of the hearings.  Such an obligation stems from the universally recognized duties of the arbitrators to devote proper time for the arbitrations they accept and to conduct the arbitral proceedings efficiently without undue delay. In view of these general obligations, the arbitrators are expected to render their awards within such time as may be considered reasonable.  What is reasonable time primarily depends on the complexity of the dispute, the extent of pleadings and documentation in the arbitration.

We had argued in in Undue Delayin Passing Arbitral Award as a Ground for Challenge? Volume 2, Issue 1, Indian Journal of Law and Policy Review, pp. 185- 195 (2013) that delay per se should not be a ground for setting aside the arbitral award. The English Court has taken a similar stand. It is also pertinent to note that there is similarity in the English court’s approach and that of the Delhi High Court in Oil India Ltd. v. Essar Oil Ltd., 2012(3) Arb. L.R. 220 (Delhi): MANU/DE/3862/2012.

[Also see,  Peter Wilske, Legal Challenges to Delayed Arbitral Awards, Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal Vol. 6 No.2 pp. 153-186, November 2013, for a detailed discussion on the topic.]